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1. INTRODUCTION 
A. ~ groblem 
1 . The Problem Defined 
In May of 1897 the Dow- Jones and Company, publishers 
of The Wall Stree~ Journal published two set s of ttAvere.ges" 
(industrials and rails} to serve as accurate and concise 
measures of stock market act ivity . By far the most i mportant, 
of t !1e two averages today is the Dow-Jones Industr ial Average . 
The "Average" invented by Charles Henry Dow, then editor of 
the Journal , was devised with two basic concepts in mind . 
First, that the s t;o ck market as a whole had an underlyi ng 
trend distinct from the daily flucuations of individual stocks. 
Secondly, employment of all l isted stocks in comprising an 
average was impractical due to their large number , frequent 
withdrawals and additions, vast discrepancies in degree of 
act iv:i.ty , etc . * 
Thus a simple arithmeti c average was constructed 
consisting orgin~lly of twelve industrial stocks. Through the 
~a, p . 9 . 
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years many and varied chaneas have been made until at present 
the "Average'' num.'bers thirty selected stocks, but for all in-
tent and purposes it .tells a continuous story from its incep-
tion to the present. Although the "Industrial Average" was 
first orginated in connection with what later developed as 
the Dow theory, it has in time assumed a significance apart 
from this concept. It has become by usage and custom the 
prime indicator of' stock market activity. It is not an 
exaggeration to state that any discussion, past, present, or 
future concerning the stock market will invariably include 
somewhere iri the conversation--the mention of the Dow-Jones 
Industrial Average . It is printed daily in every newspaper 
of any appreciable size throughout the United States . Any 
brokerage frim of some magnitude is equipped with a Dow-Jones 
ticker which transmits quotations of the "Average" hourly. 
The offices of the leading figures in the financial world 
are usually adorned with a chart showing the path of t he 
Dow-Jones Industrial Average through the years. 
The reliability of the "Average" especially in the 
past has been almost faultless as evidenced by its wide accep-
tance and usage during its over fifty years of existence. How-
ever, during our present economic period especially since the 
end of World War II, there has been increasing criticism of 
the "Average" in financial circles. These comments challenge 
the accuracy of the "Average". They indicate that its composi-
tion is not broad enough, that its method of computation is 
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unrealistic, that is dominated by leaders, and that these 
factors combine to create a fallacious picture. It was also 
pointed out that just because the "Average" has been reliable 
in the past is no reason to assume it will be ~alid now . Aside 
from the fact tha1; these statements were made by prominent 
leaders iri the financial field, two brief examples wi ll be 
cited at tlus t~ma to indicate their contentions bear some 
investigation. 
In the yeaD 1951 according to the Dow-Jones Indus-
trial Average the market rose over 14~, but during the same 
period one out of every three st ocks l isted on the New York 
Stock Exchange declined in value ,* A more concrete example 
occured in the latter part of 1949 . On a particular day the 
ttrndustrial Average" declined 1 . 42 in the first hour, 1 . 09 
points of this dip was attributed to Allied Chemicals selling 
for over $200.00 a share and one or two other high price 
securities. At this time t he "Average" was composed of thirty 
stocks, th*s the decline in over 90% of the issues amounted 
th only . 33 cents . Yet the "Average" itself supposidly de - · 
picting the entire market dropped 1 . 42 . ~~ 
*19, p . 13. 
-~~~35, p . 2645 . 
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2. Importance to ~ Stock Market 
• From the first section one has received a hint as to 
the vast importan(~e of the "Average" to the financial world . 
Not only is it an indicator of stock market activity, but those 
who employ it in making decisions concerning buying and selling 
may by their action shape the market. The Security and Exchange 
Commi ssion observed of the September 5, 1946, break in the mar-
ket, that Dow Theorists (who use the nrndustrial Average" as 
a basic determinant together with other indicators to make 
their moves} acco1rnted for 20% of the selling and were re-
sponsible for a sizable proportion of the push of May four -
teenth of that year . i: The full significal. ce of the above 
statement can be realized when one notes bhat it does not 
take into account those individual who although they are not 
strict "Dow Theoristsn often join on the so-called "band wagontt; · 
nor other groups which use the "Industrial Avera3e" in con-
nection with various formula plans. 
Thus it can be seen that with a substantial group 
relying on the "Average" as a more or less automatic device, 
and an even large:t> number using it as a. pertinent factor in 
{~42, p • 110 • 
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making decisions; that an inaccurate "Industrial Average" 
could create an a.rtifically high or low market. Naturally 
in time the market would readjust itself, but such a condi-
tion might usduly upset the entire stability of the exchange, 
which reverberations could conceivably be felt by our entire 
economy . 
3 . Importance of the Investor 
----~---
The accuracy of the "Average" is not ohly important 
to the stability of the stock market, but is of vital cons4-
quence to the invE~stor who may suffer financial loss as a 
result of it. First of all thePe is the individual investor 
both large and small, who through his broker or, if he makes 
his own decisions personally, is influenced by the "Average". 
I believe it has been well stated that even for the experts 
in the investment field it is extremely difficult to interpret 
and forecast stock market activity, let alone the amateur 
trader . So with this difficulty in mind the use or reliance 
on a tool that is basically unreliable or inferior certainly 
will not help matt;ers. 
Secondly, there is that large group of "Eow Theorists" 
who use the "Industrial Average" in conjunction with other 
indicators, notably the Dow-Jones Rail Average to determine 
-10-
the timing of their purchases and sales. It is pert inent 
to note at this time that operation of the Dow Theory has 
been eminently successful in the past. However, in a 
recent study it was pointed out that from .the per iod June 3, 
193~ to June, 1948, four out of five sales and repurchases 
according to strict Dow Theory techniqles have proved unprofit-
able .* 
Finally there are those institutional investors 
who use various formul a ·.plans to direc t their transactions 
in the market. By far the greate st majority of the se employ 
the Dow-Jones Industrial Average in one •ay or another in 
their calculations . The following are a few examples of the 
more important ones now in use . American Board of Commissions 
for Foreign Missions, the F. I. Dupont Institutional Plan , 
the seven step Formula Plan, originated by the Keystone 
Company of Boston, and the plans used by Vassar and Oberli n 
College . ~~:-
. B. Method of Approach 
Before the actual method is discussed it is pertinent 
to note at this time t hat the Wall Street Journal besides pub-
lishing an "Industrial Averagen also circulates a Rail, Utility, 
-it-7 ' p. 30. 
**18, pp. 121-134. 
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Composite, Bond, and Railroad I ncome Bond Average. That e s-
sentially they are- ail constructed :i.n a similie.r manne:r·,- but 
as poip.ted out previously the "Industrial Average" is by far 
the most important. For these reasons plus the desire for 
continuity this study has directed speci~ica1ly towards the 
"Industrial Average". A). though necessarily it will pe per-
tinent at times to mention other "Averages". Any results and 
conclusions concerning the Industrial Average will thus be 
applicable to the other Dow-Jones Indicators . 
My analysis of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average will 
be divided into six S:Pparate phases. First, an introductory 
section defining the problem and indicating its importance. 
Secondly, historical background material concerning the 
subject . The emphasis of this portion will be placed on 
those periods when the market experienced pronounced flucua-
tions either up or down. 
Thirdly, a de t ai l ed study of the "A.verage" as it 
exists t oday in relationship to its composition and its 
method of computation. FourthlY,; an examination of the Dow 
Theory and formula plans which depend significantly on the 
"Industrial Average , " and a comparison between the subject 
and other popular market barometers with a view to ' pointing 
ont the major di~_f'erences in methods employed and .!'dSults 
obtained. 
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Fifthly, an independent statistical study of some 
950 common stocks listed on the New York Stock ·and American 
Exchange, to dete:rmine the actual degree of reliability of the 
"Average" in portrayingthe market in our present period; using 
t he high and low points of the Dow-Jones Industrial since 1942 
as a basis for the calculations. Finally a bringing together 
of the arguments both pro and con as implied from the study 
with a view to constructive accurate suggestions for improve-
ment and intell igent use of the "Average". 
C. :!!!!!.~ ££ the Work of Others 
Extensive research of source material concerning the 
subject has reveal that although many prominent ! inanciers are 
awai'e of the problem (mainly through articles in prominent 
business and fina:ncial publicati_ons , ana personal interviews 
wi th brokers ·and' analysts interested in the problem} no one 
has developed it fully. There has been no extensive studies 
concerning the many aspects and ramifications of the problem. 
_Conspiculously lacking has been statistical data. to establish 
the actual degr ee of relia.bili ty which the "Average" possesses. 
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2. Historical Background 
A. Inception of the Averages 
An English economist whose unaffected humanity 
always made him remarkabley readable, William Stanley Jemms 
propounded the theory of the connection between commercial 
panics and spots on the sun. He gave a series of dates from 
the beginning of the 17th C~ntury showing an apparent coinci-
dence between the two phenomena. The above conception to a 
student of finance today would invariably bring a look .of 
astonishment as if to say "How could anyone have believed 
it." Yet at the time it was published the idea was widely 
accepted by the business world.~*' 
The state of men's minds had improved somewhat con-
cerning the subject of interperting business activity, when 
Charles Henry Dpw came on the scene, in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century. Born in 1850, he gained his iniatia.l 
business experience in journalism as a reporter under S~uel 
Bowles, editor of the Springfield Union. From here he became 
a member of the brokerage firm of Robert Goodbody and Company, 
where he served for five years, executing orders for the firm 
on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange. However, newspaper 
*8, p. 1. 
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work was more to his liking and to it he ·. returned better pre-
pared by his knowledge of financial matters. It was about this 
time he evolved his basic ideas concerning the stock market as 
a basic barometer of business activity . Dow presented his con-
cept in a series of editorials in !h! ~ Street Journal. He 
pointed out that beneath the flucuations of individual stocks 
there was at all times a trend of the market as a whole. This 
trend is determined by the changes in the prices of stocks 
which are bought and sold every business day by brokers of 
the New York Stock Exchange. These brokers are executing 
orders for customers and for themselves. Each share of stock 
represents ownership of a definite fraction of some business 
enterprise. The owner of each share of stock is virtually a 
partner in that corporation. He may sever his connection with 
the business on a moments notice by selling his stock. He does 
not sell it to th~ company or to the New York Stock Exchange in 
the perpetual auction that the Exchange conduct, but to other 
individual investors like himself. The prices at wi1ich every 
transaction is made are carefully recorded and widely published . 
Naturally the prices at which transactions occur vary from day 
to day, and there the theory life.* 
These continual sales and purchases of stock on the 
floor of the exchange are transacted from a number of posts 
by a trader, each conducting a separate auction for the stock 
~:-a, p . 16. 
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of a particular company. Securities are bid up or sold down 
accor.ding to public demand and the supply available. Back 
in the early days of trading in securities, it was assumed 
that shares of different companies flucuated in price indepen-
dent of. each othe:t>. Perhaps they did and do to some extent 
now. However, wi·~h the advent of the organized stock exchange, 
the perfection of communicat~on and rapid transportation facili-
ties, combining to make the wide dissemenation of news public; 
Dow perceived a new element in price flucuations. This element 
was a trend, that is the greater body of sto ck prices moved in . 
unison over the long run.~:- Long before Dow the fact was known 
to bankers and businessmen'. that the securities of all es tablished 
companies tended 'to go up or down in price together, but the 
first editor of The Wall Street Journal was the first to ex-
press the concept in terms of average prices of a few selected 
representative stocks.~H:· 
In order to measure and discern this trend, Dow 
reali§ing 'it was :tmpractice.l to employ the values of all the 
stock listed on the exchange devised theidee. of a representa-
tive market average. This average first appeared as part of e. 
daily le.tter published by the Dow-Jones and Company in 1884., 
and had a large c:lrcu1ation in the financial districts of' New 
~a7, PP• 5-s. 
-iHI-6 1 p • 11. 
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York. The average printed was a simple arithmetic one, con-
sisting of the closing prices of eleven active representati ve 
stock, nine of which were rails and the remaining two indus-
trials. The orginal average read as follows: 
Chicago & North Western R.R, 
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paal R~R. 
Delware Lackawanna R.R. 
Lake Shore R.R. 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. 
Missourri Pacific R.R. 
New York Central R.R. 
Northern Pacific R.R. Pfd. 
Pacific Mail . 
Union Pacific R~R. 
We stern Union{l-
Soon the prominence of the Delware and Hudson R.R .. 
warranted its addition to the list making a total of twelve 
stocks. The computing of the average then consisted of merely 
f inding the daily sum of the stocks named and dividing by 
twelve. As time pro gressed other issues became active and it 
as becoming evident that a more comprehensive list of stocks 
was needed to rep:resent the market properly. Acting on t his 
belief the Dow-:ffones and Company extended the list t o i nclude 
eight additional members, all railroads. By this time the 
"Letter" which first consisted of but two pages had developed 
to such slze that a fUll fledged daily newspap er seemed war-
ranted . And on July 8, 1899, with Charles Henry Dow as its 
i!-22, p • A-3. 
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first editor The ·wall Street Journal made its appearance to 
the financial public. 
During this period from 1880 to 1890 there were many 
developments in the field of the railroads and to keep the list 
of twenty stocks representative, changes had to be made from 
time to time. Meanwhile the industrial field was expanding 
in scope with the formation of the tobacco, steel, whiskey, 
oil and sugar trusts that promised much to the interests con-
cerned. Their possibilities combined with the inevitable large 
risk and uncertainty, created an ideal field for the speculator . 
The stacks of these companies were being actively traded in 
and had to be recognized in an average supposed to be compre-
hensive. However, the industrials were hardly comparable to 
the rails either as to the:J.r stage of development or as to the 
price. It was therefore best to construct an average for in-
dustrials separate from that of the rails. 
On June 5, 1896, there appeared for the first time in 
The Wall ~S~t~r~e~e~t Journal two averages, one based on twenty rail-
road stocks and the other on twelve active representative in-
dustrial shares. The components of the "Industrial Average" 
were as follows--
American Cotton Oil 
American Sugar 
American Tobacco 
Chicago Gas 
Distilling & Cattle Feeding 
General Electric 
Laclede Gas 
National Lead 
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North American 
Tenn. Coal and Iron 
u.s. Leather Pfd. 
U.S. Rubber~} 
The remainder of this chapter will deal with the path 
of the "Industrial Average" through the years till 19~2, stres-
sing those periods when the market experienced marked fluctuations: 
and revealing that the "Average" is not only a continuous indi -
cator of stoke market activity, but of the state of business 
as well. 
The first "Average" computed in that June of 1896 
was 40-94. It was in that year that Mickinley was elected 
as President registering the victory of gold over silver, and 
purported also to be a triumph for the business man. This was 
to be a period of rugged individualism, fDee from long depres-
sions and enhanced by the birth of industrial stocks. As 
early as 1885 the New York Stock .Exchange had established a 
department of unlisted securities to handle this new type of 
issue, but as yet only a handful! were represented. With 
the new administration however, a combined rush began, 
·i} 4 J p • 330 • 
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reminiscent of the gold rush of '49, but this time instead 
of west the tide surged eastward to Wall Street* 
During the years up to the beginning of the 29th 
Century several changes were necessitated in the composition 
of the "Average." In Novemeer of 1897--Peoples Gas was sub-
stitued for Chicago Gas; September 1898--u.s. Rubeer Common 
replaced General Electric; April, 1899 list changed in several 
particulars and in that month it read as £allows: American 
Cotton Oil, Consolidated Tabacco, Federal Steel, General 
Electric, U~S. Leather, Pfd., National Lead, Pacific Mail , 
Peoples Gas, U.S. Rubber Common, American Seeel & Wire , and 
Tenn . Coal & Iron. The" Average" had gone from its all time 
low o~ 28.48 in August, 1891, to a high of 77.61 in September 
of 1899. -::-r.· 
The Stock Excahnge welcomed the century by registering 
its s econd largest volume of transactions in its history, and 
what was to prove a very amazing t hird of a century was on its 
way . Two motivating factors were present at this time, first 
an accelerated flow of investment and risk-bearing capital; 
and secondly .daring entrepreneUBs with practically unlimited 
financial resources. Beginning with the u.s. Steel merger 
7a3, PP· 121-123. 
~~8, P• 26 and PP• 324-328. 
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in 1901 many potential industrial gaints appeared on the scene 
such as Johns Manville, Eastman Kodak, Dupont , and Corn Pro-
ducts to name just a few. The trust were also growing in leaps 
and bounds. In 1904 Moodys published a report stating that 
432 trusts controlled 8,664 companLes r~presenting a total capi-
talization of over $20 billion.-:.:-
There is no doubt that this activity in common stocks 
was one of the major reasons for the prosperity of the early 
1900 ' s. This boom continued unheeded except for a slight 
bear market in 1903 when the "Average" fell to a low of 42. 
However, the · speculators were not thwarted and they and the 
market resumed its merry pace. In 1906 the "Average" reached 
the highest point since i:ts lnception when i t ·· :registered at 
103 •· It was also in that year the California Earthquake 
occurred foreshadowing the impending panic on the horizon . 
Economists and financial writers were already viewing the 
growing shortage of money with alarm. These warning were 
unheeded as prosperity rose to an extreme point in 1907 only 
to collapse in the panic.-:H:· 
Meanwhile there had been a considerable number of 
changes in the items composing the "Average" as follows: 
June, 1901, several substitutes so that on tlus date it 
:('ead--Amalgomated Copper, American Smelting and Refining 
Company, American Sugar, Consolidated Tobacco, International 
-l!-13, pp. 125-154. • 
-:.:~n , PP • 3oo -3o2. 
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raper Pfd. and Smelters Pfd.; April .1905 U.s. Rubber Fi:Dst 
Pfd. for u.s . Leather Pfd; and. finally in November, 1907--
General Electric for Tenn. Coal and Iron.* 
The years from 1908-1913 were marked by depression 
and dullness with some rallies, but no s1,1bstantial more up-
wards. The Dow-Jones Industrial Average· for t be most part 
f l uotuated between 75 and 85 points. European ~. War burst out 
in August 1, 1914, bringing with it financial panic all over 
the world, but u.s . business was so well liquidated that no 
serious national catastrophe occurred. The War immediately 
absorbed the attention of the world and every move in business 
and finance was predicated upon conditions prevailing in Europe. 
The Exchange had closed in July due to the great volume of 
orders to sell, but reopened in December without any major 
drop in security prices . By 1915 ·. unrestricted trading was 
permitted and the so-called nwar-babies" started incubating. 
The solid foundation laid by the depression of the years com-
bined with expanding production for war produced a boom. 
Phenominal expansion had been accomplished by 1916 when the 
"Average" achieved a record high of 110. A short bear mar-
ket occurred in 1917 most ly due to the entrance of the United 
States into the conflict, but prosperity was quick to return. 
The sudden end of the war on November 11, 1918 brought with 
it forecasts of depression.f* 
-li-8, PP • 270-271. 
~HH, pp • 308-321. 
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In the years since 1907 to the First World War the 
components of the "Average" undersent several ch~es. In 
I 
May, 1912, Central Leather Common replaced Colorado Fuel and 
mron. A major revision took place in September of 1916 when 
constitutents of the "Average" was increased from 12 to 20 
issues. The new list contained eight of the stocks of the 
preceeding group and tl{elve new ones, and read as follows: 
Americru~ Beet Sugar 
American Car and Foundary 
American Lo comotive 
American Smelting 
American Sugar 
AmericaQ Tel . & Tel. 
Anaconda Copper 
Baldwin Locomotive 
Central Leather 
General Electric 
Goodrich 
Republic Iron & Steel 
Studedbaker 
Texas Company 
u.s. Steel 
Utah Copp er 
Westinghouse 
Western Union 
On October 13, 1915, a new ruling by the Exchange resulted .in 
another change. Up to this time the ''Average" had been computed 
on a percentage basis, but now all transactions pursuant to 
the order were put in terms of dollars per share. The nin-
dustrial Average" was therefore computed on a monetary basis .* 
The predicted depression for 1919 never materialized 
mainly as the result of the continued demand by Europe for 
American goods, only this time for peaceful purposes. u.s. 
loans continued to those countries and a post-war inflation 
was in £ull swing. However, all good things must come to an 
end as overproduction, high prices, and the worlds general 
financial distress brought the boom abruptly to a finish in 
~~-a, p. 272. 
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1920 ·*·: The ·depression petered itself out by 1921 with un-
filled desire of the public "tor consumer goods still existing • . 
Prosperity soon followed, stimulated by this unsatiated de-
mand, and the coming of the auto industry into its own. People 
soon forgot there was anything like the word depression in 
the. dictionary. Buying of stocks became the mania for all 
classes of people and the r oaring twenties was merrily on 
its way. There had only been one change in the composi tion 
of the "Average" since 1916 and that was the substitution 
of Corn :Products for Anierican Beet Sugar in Ma!'ch, 1920 .~:-:~ 
c. Period ~-~ 
This period which begm~ on a bright note arising 
from a depression was to be one of the darkest in our history. 
Although the country experienced slight business slumps iP 
1924 and again in 1927 , the long period of prosperi t ;y up·: to 
1929 persuaded many people that the business cycle was a thing 
of the past. The consumption of goods inc~eased as the years 
we.q.t by, busines s activity and corporate earnings i ncreased 
by leaps and bounds as speculation ran rampart. The volume 
-ia3, PP• 2o2-2o3. 
*-:l-8, p. 2721 
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of transactions on the New York Stock Exchange increased rapidly 
and six million share days became frequent. Stock and bond 
prices rose to outbelievable heights. The "Average" · rose from 
a low of 65 in 1921 to as high as 300 by the end of .1928.-::-
Meanwhile several major and minor changes had arisen 
in the contents and compiling of the "Industrial Average". 
January, 1924--American Tobacco substituted for Corn Froducts, 
Mack Truck for Central Leather, Dupont for Goodrich, Sears 
Roebuck for Texas Company; February, 1929, Standard Oil of 
California exchanged for Utah Copper; May, 1924, Woolworth 
for Republic Iron and Steel, July, 1925, General Mo tors, 
International Harvester, U.S. Reality, Texas Corporation , 
and Kennicott were substituted for Anaconda, Baldwin Locomotive, 
DuPont, Studebaker, and Standard Oil of California. I n Decem-
ber, 1925, Allied Chemical, Famous-P'I Lasky, Remmington Type-
writer for u.s .. Reality, Westinghouse, and Kennicott. March, 
1927, Paramount for Famous-PI Lasky. Finally on March, 1928, 
National Biscuit and Eastman Kodakk were substitut ed fo r United 
Drug and Western Union. 
On September 20, 1928, the method of computing the 
nAverage 11 was revised. Frevious to this date the nAverage" was 
compiled by totaling the daily closing prices of the component 
stocks and then dividing by the number of units, 20. However, 
<{~26, p. 3. 
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in the case where a ·stock ha4 been split it was necessary t o 
compensate for the change by using multipliers. For example 
if a . stock was split 2 for 1, instead of using t he dai l y 
clo sing price, the quotation would be multiplied by 2 . Stock 
spli t ups occur when existing stockholders are issued e.ddi tional 
shar·es of stock for .Jeach share held or when existing shares 
e.re r·eplaced by a greater number of shares. No cash payment 
is involved. The aggregate claim of the stockholder on t he 
cap i tal of the company is not increased. Therefore each n e 1 
sh$.r•o represents a Sllln.J..ler claim than before. These stock 
sp lite. are very common in periods of prosperity bot h i'or the 
fac t that the stock is usually selling very high and t h e 
corporation wishes to broaden their market, and shareholders 
belir ve it wi 11 eventually mean higher stock prices f or them • .z~ 
The new method of compensation was devi sed i n order 
· to el i mina t e the occasional distortions resulting f r om mult :t -
p l y1ng i ndividual stocks by various factors, and at the sane 
time t o p re serve the 31 year sequence of the "Averagen . The 
o l d me t hod besides be i ng clumsy, often resulted in f a lse values. 
For example , when one of the multiplied shares moved counter 
t o the general market trend or in the case where a s t ock 
di ~idend of less than 100~, where the practice was to make 
no compensation, a misrepsentation resulted. The new procedure 
was based on a simple mathematical expedient . Instead of 
~-25~ p . 15. 
-26-
dividing .' the components and their multipliers by their number, 
the total share prices without any multiplication were divided 
by 12.7. This divisor was arrived at on the basis of the 
September 8, closing values, and is merely a constant figure 
which relates the seme average on the new as on the old basis; 
on the day before the current procedure was adopted. The value 
of the "Average" on September 8, the old way, including 
American Car multiplied by 6, American Tobbaco by 2, General 
Electric by 4, and Sears Roebuck by 4, was 4822.375. This 
figure when divided by 20 gave the Dow-Jones Industrial Aver-
age of 241.11. The total of the twenty stocks without eny 
multipliers was 3060.5. Dividing the latter total by 12.7 
gave an !'Average" of 240.98 or approximately the same as ob-
tained previously. Under this sys tem the divsor 12.7, would 
be constant until a sul:)stitutions or split up occurred and at 
that time it would be adjusted to compensate for the change.~:-
On October 1, 1928, the list of stocks was increased 
f rom 20 to its present number 30, and at that time several sub-
stitutions were made in order to maintain the representative 
character of the "Average". As of that date the "Average" 
was made up of the following members: 
~:-;t5, . p. 18 • 
. . . . 
Allied Chemical 
.American Can 
American Smelting 
American 'Sugar 
American Tabacco B 
Atlantic Refining 
Bethlehem Steel of New Jersey 
Chrysler 
General Electric 
General Motors 
General Railway Signal 
Goodrich 
International Harvester 
International Nickle 
Mack Truck 
Nash Motors 
North .American 
Paramount 
Postum. 
Radio 
Sears Roebuck 
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Standard Oil of NewJersey 
.Texas Corporation 
Texas Gulf Sulfur 
Union Carbide 
u.s. Steel 
Victor. Talking Machines 
Westinghouse Electric 
Woolworth 
Wright-Aero~~ 
(The various substitutions and the addition of 10 new stocks 
caused the constant divisor to increase to 16.67} . 
The stock market opened in 1929 with the "Average" 
registering a new high of 308 as prosperity continued on its 
furious pace. It is interesting to note that for the previous 
year the "Industrial Average" earned only 5.40 per cent (% of 
earn ings to selling price}. This same "Average" had earned 
11.90 per cent in the years iince 1897 and t he only time the 
earnings ratio had every approached such ·a low fi gure ~as in 
a previous period of severe depression~:·* · In early September 
The 'rAverage" reached its all time high of 386, and from t his 
point stock prices began to decline gathering momentwn until 
they reached panic proportions . By the end of November the 
"Average" was down to 238 a decline if almost 40% in less than 
three months, representing a shrinkage in value of an estimated 
-ll-23a, p. 1. 
-ll--~2, p . 129. 
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$30 billion, the largest and most sudden drop in paper values 
in stock market history. Fortunes were wiped out over night 
and financial houses were badly ~haken. The pyramiding of 
investment trusts was one of the chief factors for t his top 
heavy market. However, fluctuations of new securities con-
tinued to flood the market, brokers loans soared to a new 
peak and the bankingsituation became uneven. 1930 was a year 
of world wide depression. The decline of business activity 
which began the year previous was temporarily hal ted as people 
stood by hoping a severe business depression could be averted 1 
and in fact the market was ahle to recoup some of its losses. 
However, the decline commenced a new with the "Industrial 
Average" dropping to 164 at the end of the year. This year 
differed from 1929 in that the stock market break was the 
dominant factor in that period, while 'in 1930 the year was 
characterized by weakness and decline in the entire economy. 
Bank failures were common't-farm and real estate prices his bot-
tom, and unemployment reached 6 million by the end of the year. 
1931 continued the dovmward trend, the "Average" went only as· 
high as 132 and recorded its low of 52 in December. The 
foreign situation was not improving as commodity prices fell 
all over the world. Grade A bonds price were affected seriously 
for the first time as the physical volume of business went down 
to new low. In 1932 the depression reached its lowest ebb 
when the "Industrial Average" reached a low of 42 in June a.s 
compared with a high of 386 just three years previous. A 
bond investment pool formed under the auspices of the New 
York banks, and headed by J. P. Morgan & Bompany caused a 
sharp upward movement in the early summer, but on the whole 
it was only a temporary measure.~:-
The great extent to which stock value shrunk is il-
lustrated by the following table dep~cting the comparative 
prices of selected stock that composes the Dow-Jones Industrial 
verage. Table I. 
Ten Year C~cle of. Selected Common Stock Prices 
Stocks . Low 1923 High 1929 Low 1932 
Allied Chemical 59~~ 355 42 
American Can 73 738 118 
Anaconda Copper 32 175 3 
Dupont 106 1617 154 
General Electric 168 1612 186 
General Motors 168 1073 40 
Union Carbide 51 420 46 
u.s . Steel 85 360 30 
~:-Adjustments made for stock splitups.-:H~ 
During this period the r;omponents of the "Averag e" 
changed in many particulars a~ follows: January, 1929, 
Victor Talking Machine was replaced by National Cash Regis-
ter; July, 1929, General Foods for Postum; Septemer, 1929, 
Curtis Wright for Westinghouse; January, 1930, Johns Manville 
r 
·for North America; April, 1930, Paramount ~ublic for Paramount; 
{n, PP. 336-344. 
~Hl-13 1 p • 241. 
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July, 1930, Borden, Eastman Kodak, Goodyear, Ligget & Myers, 
Standard Oil of California, United Air Transport, Hudson Motors 
for American Sugar, American Tabacco, Atlantic Refining, 
General Railway Signal, Nash Motors, Goodrich and Wright-Curtiss; 
May, 1932, American Tobacco B, Drug Inc, Proctor & Gamble, 
Lowes, Nash Motor , International Shoe, International Business 
Machine, and Coco Cola, substituted for Ligget & Myers, .Mack 
Truch, United Air Transport, Paramount Public, Radio Corp, 
Texas Gulf Sulnhur, National Cash Register, and Hudson Motors . 
... ' . 
The divisor as a result of the above changes and stock splits 
was reduced to 15.46 by the end of 1932.~<-
D. Period 1933-1942 
The second third of the century opened on an ominous 
not a s serious banking disturbances further undermined con-
f i dence . By March, 1933, the situation had reached crisis 
· proportions and the President declared a national "bank 
holiday". The gradual re-opening of sound bm ks together with 
emergency legislation started the economy on the long road 
back to mormalcy. In April, the gold standard, which 
ironically had started the 20th century on its merry way, 
was abandoned. The "Industrial Average" went from a low 
of 55 in March to a high of 108 for the year. · The years 
1934-1936 were marked by general recovery, aided by heavy 
~:·23 a, p. 1. 
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government expenditurex. These times also saw ·the passage 
of social legislation in an effort to make the government 
more responsible for the fortunes of the individual American. 
Reforms spurred on by the remembrance of the abuses that led 
to the depression, were instituted notably in the form of 
the Security Acts of 1933 and 1934. The "Industrial Average" 
ranged from 97 to 148 in 1936. -:~ 
By 1937 the "Average" rose as high as 194 after six 
years of relatively low readings. In that year businessmen 
found themselves with inventories piling up at staggering 
rates, as a result of the prevailing fear of inflation from 
continue government spending. Stock prices dipped markedly 
in the spring of '37 followed by a summer recovery. A 
second decline started in late August that caught financial 
observers unawares. The speed at which values fell reached 
panic proportion, but the extraordinary fact was that the 
volume of transactions were astonishingly low. Inasmuch as 
there was no great outpourings of securities or serious over 
expansion of credit a harmful depression did not result. 
The "Average" only dropped to a low of 113, however tt did 
go as low as 98 in March of 1938. -lH!-
{n, PP• 347-351. 
-lBH6, pp. 97-98. 
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In the above years since 1932 there had been only 
minor changes in the composition of the "Average" as follow s : 
August , 1933, Corn . roducts and United Aircraft for Drug Inc. 
and International Shoe; August, 1934, National Distillers 
Co., United Air Craft; November, 1935, Dupont replaced 
Borden and National Steel changed places with Coco Cola; 
March, 1936, Bethlehem Steel of Delaware for Bethlehem Steel 
of New Jersey; January, 1937, Nash Kelvinator for Nash Motors. 
The divismr continued its decline i n value begun in 1932, 
and was at 15.1 by the end of 1938. -:~ 
The year 1939 started on an ominious note as w~r 
clouds fi lled the horizon. In March Hitler made his first 
major move and invaded Chzechoslovakia.. The "Average" re-
flected the inbidence by declining some 30 points. Although 
t he world tried to rati onalize the situation it was evident 
the die was cast. The stock market made a. valiant effort 
towards optimism and by the end of the summer had recovered 
most of its losses. The gain was short lived as on September 
first, Hitler invaded Po land, World War II had commenced in 
earnest. The market again reacted by losing several points, 
but it was a. far cry from the flooding of orders to sell that 
occurred in 1914. People remembered the "war babies" of the 
*23a, p. 1. 
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First World War as the stock market .leveled off on::a plateau, 
and began a period of nervous waiting.~~ 
Hitler made short work of Poland and soon was march-
ing through the heart of Europe. The pound sterling fell to 
its lowest level in its free market history, and on May 10, 
1940, Neville Chamberlain was displaced as ?rime Minister . 
Four days latter, ~he eight month wait as reflected in the 
stock market crossed public opinion with a crash on May 
fourteenth. The "Industrial Average" shedded $35 in a scant 
two days. The market rallied somewhat, but an ensuing decline 
set in that carried prices down until April, 1942. Me anwhile 
the United States was pursuing a course of belligerent neu-
trality. The market dropped again as a result of Pearl Har-
bor and rallied slightly when we declared war on Germany and 
Italy, only to decline again until the low of April, 1942 . 
This brings us to the period of independent statistical study 
treated in Chapter 5 . At that time the historical material 
from April, 1942, to the present will be covered.~~·~· 
The components of the "Average" underwent only two 
minor changes in the above years as follows: March, 1939 , 
Nash Kelvinator being replaced by United Aircraft and American 
Telephone and Telegraph exchanged for International Business 
Machines in the same period the divisor was reduced to 15 .1. 
The chart on the following page shows the path of the "Industrial 
Average" during period studied in this chapter . *·!~* 
*13, pp. 267-270. 
~BH3, pp. 270-273. 
~H~-1~13 a , p. 1. 
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3.Pl'esent Status 
A. Composition and Method of Computing 
Since the March, 1939, substitution mentioned in the 
last chapter there have been no changes in the composition of 
the "AvePage". Thus the Dow-Jones Industrial Average at the 
writing of this paper. stands as follows: 
Allied Chemical 
American Can 
American Smelting 
American Tel. & Tel. 
American Tob$cco B 
Bethlehem Steel 
Chrysler 
Corn :Products 
Du Pont 
Eastman Kodak 
General Electric 
General Foods 
General Motors 
Goodyear 
International Harvester 
International Nickel 
Joh.ris Manville 
Loews Inc. 
National Distillers 
National Steel 
Procter & Gamble 
Sears Roebuck 
Standard Oil of California 
Standard Oil of New Jersey 
Texas Company 
Union Carbide 
Union Aircraft 
u.s . Steel 
Westinghouse Elec tric 
Woolworth:·::· 
Although the composition has not changed the divisor 
because of numerous splits has varied several times until it 
is now 6.16. This di vsor is the key to the method of compu-
tation and to determine the ttAverage" daily. It was noted 
earlier that this figure must be changed every time there is 
a change in the composition, a stock split occurs, or any other 
occurrence which if not accounted for that woul d distort the 
ttA.verage". The principle involved is that the "Index" must 
~~47 . 
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remain the same before and after a change. This is accomplished 
by computing the stocks before the disturbing incident, then 
equating this "Average 11 to the new total after the change and 
t hen divide by "x". The resulting answer is the new divisor. 
This is illustrated in the following exaw~le which happened 
on May 25, 1932 when the last major substitutions occured . 
Table IIv 
Divisoral Change in "Industrial Average 11 May 25, 1932 
Stoc1(s Used 
May 25, l952 
Cl>sing Prices 
May 26, 1932 
Allied Chemical 
American Can 
.£:.t11e rl can Smelting 
Borden 
Eastman Kodak 
Goodye ar 
Bethlehem Steel 
Chrysler 
General Electric 
General Mo tors 
Liggett & Myers 
Standard Oi l of Cal. 
International HarvesteP 
International Nickel 
Mack Truck 
Unit d Aircraft & Trans . 
Johns Manville 
Paramo unt Public 
General Foods 
Radio Corporation 
Sears Roebuck 
Standard Oil of N.J. 
Texas Corporation 
Texas Gult' Sulpher 
Union Carbide 
u.s . Steel 
National Cash Register 
West inghouse Electric 
Woolworth 
Hudson ~.Mo tors 
52 1/2 
37 
7 1/4 
25 
42 l/2 
7 
11 
5 1/8 
12 1/2 
10 
36 
18 lh2 
1 6 l/(2 
4 3/8 
12 1/4 
7 5/8 
11 1/2 
1 5/8 
24 
2 3/4 
16 1/4 
24 3/.4 
10 5'/8 
14 7/8 
17 3/8 
28 1/8 
7 5~8 
23 37.4 
27. 1/2 
3 
stocks Substituted 
May 26, 193§ 
American Tobacco 
Drug Inc. 
Procter & Gamble 
Loews 
Nash Motors 
International Shoe 
I. B. M. 
Coco Cola 
Cont. 
Clesing 
Prices 
3,26, 32 
53 1/4 
30 1/8 
29 
17 1/2 
9 1/8 
36 1/2 
71 3/4 
92 1/2 
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(May 25, 1932, Illustration Continued} 
Sum of May 26, prices before substitution. - 518188 
Divisor used prior to substitution--10.38 
Dow-Jones Average May 25, 1932: 518.88 • 49.99 
10.38 
Sum of May 26, prices after substitution-772.88 
New Divsor to be used henceforth with new sample 772.88 • 49.99 • 
X 
x - 15.46 constant divisor. ~!-
B. The Dow Theory 
1. The Theory 
772.88 • X 
49.99 
The Dow Theory has already been mentioned several tim~s 
in this text, both as regards to its dependence on the "Average" 
aad in connection with its author. The main purpose ·or this 
section is to develop the "theory" with a view to pointing out 
the importance of the "Industrial Average" as a necessary 
tool. The formulation of the Dow Theory was not a simple and 
clear cut matter. Mr. Dow worked out the theory in his own 
mind , but never actually published it in a formal treatise. 
It was gathered only from several editorial by Dow concerning 
the market, printed in The ~ Street Journal in 1901 and 1902. 
*25, pp .. 18-19. 
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The first time the concept was ever . explained as a unit and 
in a comprehensive manner, it was done by S. A. Nelson in 
his book The A. B. C1 s of Stock §Peculation in 1902*• 
After Dow's death the theory was developed and edited 
by different students of the market, notably William Peter 
Hamilton and Robert Rhen. The former had served under Dow 
and became the editor of the Journal on his death. In his 
writings in the form of editorials on the condition of the 
stock market, Hamilton did not claim to contribute anything 
essential to · the concept. Instead he corrected it where 
recent facts showed it to be faulty and developed implica-
tions only mentioned by Dow.~~ 
Basically the theory states that first, the "Averagt§" 
(Industrial and Rails} discount everything. They reflect 
the combined market activity of thousands of investors including 
those possesed of the greatest foresight and the best informa-
tion on trends and events. Even unpredicted incidents when 
they happen are quickly appraised and their possible effects 
discounted. Secondly, there are simultaneously three move-
ments in progress in the stock market. The major or primary 
movement which tends to run over a period of at least a year 
and is generally much longer. Coincident with it is a secon-
dary movement represented by sharp rallies in a bear market 
*15, p. 1. 
~~-5, p. 9. 
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and sharp react ions in a bull market. It usually covers a 
period of three to twelve months . Also present with the two 
movements mentioned are the numerous breaks of day to day 
flucuations . These are very brief and are usually less than 
six days , and though me aningless in themse lves they are im-
portant in viewing the ent ire pic ture . ~~ The three movements 
are ill ustrated on the following page. 
No~ that the theo r y has been propounded, how domit 
forecast? The forecas t er attempts to note a change in the 
economic tide by studying the height of the so - called "cyclical 
waves". The ripples per day mean little for market men a s 
long as the cap is higher than the cap of the preceding high, 
or as long as the trough is lower than the dip of the previous 
wave. It is then safe to assume the current movement is con-
tinuing. Once a tide has reached its limit the cap of the 
next wave is bound to be lower than that of the preceding one, 
etc. This phenomenum constitutes the f irst sign of a change 
in a primary movement, but i s not of itself conclusive, 
since ripples and unrecurring disturbances sometimes destroy 
the regular order of things . However , following a failure 
of a cap to exceed the preceding one, if the next trough also 
does not equal the one before it , then it is certain the tide 
has turned. It is possible to cite instances when the Dow 
Theory as explained has given false signals. For this reason 
Dow Theorists use a number of auxilliary devices in conj~nction 
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with the pure concept. Some of the important ones will be 
mentioned- briefly. -l~ 
Confirmation, the stock market as a whole and its 
major movement represents the workings of supply and demand, 
which involves every fundamental factor in the entire finan-
cial and business situation of the country . The Dow-Jones 
Industrial and Rail Averages are an inde~ of the sto ck mar-
ket and thus sum up every influence that plays upon it. There 
is no need to try and combine the "Averages" with wholesale 
or retail price indexes, with money rates, with unfilled orders, 
etc., for they have already been taken into account. When all 
the fundamental forces are bullish, both the "Industrial and 
Rail Average" will adv·ance together and thus one will confirm 
the other. Vrhen the situation is divided so that the forces 
do not act as a unit, the advance by one "Average" will not 
be parrelled by a further advance of the other. The same 
reasoning applies for the bear side of the market. Thus in 
every primary movement the "Averages" must ccnfirm and when 
they constantly refust doing this, a major swing is probably 
nearing an end. An example of this principle is shown on 
the following page • .;H!-
·~4' pp. 357-358. 
in~4, pp. 356-359 . 
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Volume, if a majpr trend is upwards dullness indi-
cates an accumulation of buying orders and conversely a 
gathering of selling orders. Mr. Dow wrote "In a bull 
period dullness runs into strength and lays the foundation 
for advance, in a bear market dullness runs into decline 
because delay brings a slow accumulation of orders to sell." 
Penetration, all penetrations are important no matter how 
minute . Mr. Hamilton wrote his now famous prediction of a 
bear market in 1929 after a penetration of .98 points. Line, 
frequently happens after a considerable rise or decline in 
the market . The flucuations of the "Averages" are confined 
within a very limited range, perhaps 4%. If the "Averages" 
are plotted there is neither an upward nor a downward trend. 
This line is due to an equilibrium of supply and demand. If 
it occurs at the top of a major cycle, it indicated distribu-
tion of stocks by the holders of la.r_ge amounts, if it occurs 
at the bottom shares are passing from weak into strong hands . 
The "Theory" as developed by recent writers like Robert Rhen 
states that if one of the "Averages" breaks out on the upper 
side and is confirmed by the other, the market will make a 
considerable advance before its direction is reversed. Double 
Tops and Bottoms, not given so much weight as previously by 
disciples of Dow, occur when prices riseto a point, decline, 
rise again to the first level only to decline once more. 
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The format i on is called a doubl e top and indicates the begin-
ning of a more extensive decline. If the market rallie s to 
the original . top a third time, the formation becomes a triple 
top. I n general it is felt that the more tops the formation 
makes the sharper will be the future decline. Double and 
t r iple bottoms are t he same formation inve2ted and signal the 
beginning of a sizabl e rally.* 
2. Success of the Theory 
The success of the Dow Theory in general can easily 
be attested to by the great number of people who have , and 
continue to follow it. Its pronounced influence on marke t 
activity was pointed out in the first chapter. Being mor e 
specific, knowing how badly the best of our business leaders 
misinterperted the autumn of 1929, on examination of the Dow 
Theorists on that date should be revealing . The "Industr ial 
Average" flashed a warning signal on October twenty-second, 
which was confirmed by the "Rails" on the next day. On Oc to-
ber 23, 1929, when most of the leaders were repeating that 
bus i ne ss and the market was #undamentally sound. Barron 's 
called attention to the crucial situation of the "averages" 
by pointing out "If the stock market now takes the other 
direction there will b e a contraction in business ." Three 
da;13 latter Mr. Hamilton wrote his famous "Turn of the Tide" 
~:-4, p . 245 and pp . 259-261 . 
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Editorial . In part he said "Of the late Charles H. Dow's 
well-lmo'l.m method of reading the stock market movement from 
The Dow-Jones Average, the 20 railroad stocks on Wednesday, 
October twenty- third confirm a bearism indication given by 
the industrials two days before . Together the averages 
gave the signal for the bear market in stocks after a major 
bull market with the unprecedented duration of almost six 
years . "~!-
In the present period however, the nTheory" has been 
widely attacked by many prominent financial observers. They 
point out that it no longer is valid due to world .and domestic 
conditions ~ It has al so been noted that the "Theory" is es-
sentially a system for interpreting the movements of market 
averages. It therefore seems logical to assume that the timing 
of the bull and bear markets signal might vary considerably de-
pending upon the construction and composition of the averages . ~H!-
A study by Benjamin Grahrun points out that the Dow 
Theory in timing its purchases and sales had an enviable his-
tory . That the caluulations as a result of using this method 
show an unbroken series of profits in operation from 1897 to 
1946. In the first forty years covered, 1897-1938, a genuine 
advantage would have resulted in nine repurchases out o~ a 
*15, p . 250. 
~H!-34 1 p • 1683,. 
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c. Formula p·lans Dependent _££ the "Average" 
Formula plans basically are mthods to force an in-
vestor automatically to take at least part of his profits 
when prices are rising, and to buy stocks when prices are 
lower. They all divide an investors fund into two separate 
parts, one is usually made up 9f cash, cash deposits, or 
securities whose prices remain fairly stable such as high 
grade bonds. The second portion consists of securities whose 
prices move up and down with the cyclical forces such as 
common stocks, speculative preferred or defaulted bonds • 
. The first part is · regaraed as the defensive or stable portion 
of the fund while the latter is the aggressive or volatile 
group. These plans assume that security prices in general will 
continue to move in both directions and thus are interested in 
the cyclical flucuations rather than the long term tendency 
to move either up or down.-i} 
Many of the most famous and successful formula plans 
now in operation use the Dow-Jones Industrial Average as a 
major tool in their calculations. Some of the most i mpor-
tant will be described briefly. American Board of Commissions 
!££ Foreign Missions ~-- a variable stock bond ratio plan, 
based onthe level of the "Industrial Average." Shifts from 
stocks to bonds and vice versa are made whenever the "Average" 
*3, pp. 233-234. 
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reaches a particular point . These points are set at 15% in-
tervals, for example 75, 89, 100, 115, etc. F. I. Dupont 
Inst itutional Plan--a sample plan provided by the New York 
firm of Francis I. duPont and Company of Wal l Stre et for the 
use of institutional investors. It is basically a stock bond 
ratio type based on a ten year moving " Industrial Average". 
A median line is determined monthly by averaging the monthly 
mean prices of the "Industrial Average" for the preceding ten 
year figure. No sale is everymade when the actual monthly 
mean price is below the ten year "Average ." Seven Ste.E 
Formula Plan--originated by the Keystone Company of Boston 
and utilizing a variable stock bond ratio bases upon the level 
of the "Industrial Average 11 • The method employed makes use of 
a number of zones, and a median and one takes the p l ace of 
t he usuall median line. A long range channel is determined 
by drawing en a logarithmic chart of th:l "Industrial Averagen, 
a straight line through the approximate bottom of the bear 
markets since 1897, and another straight line through the 
approximate top s of the bull markets since 1899, in both 
cases ignoring the 1929-1932 period. This broad cha~nel is 
then divided into five zones with the zone above the channel 
": 
and that below, giving seven zones from which the name of the 
plan is derived . A 50-50 division between defensive and ag-
gressive securities when the market is in the median zone is 
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is recommended. Whenever the "Industrial Average" declines 
to such a level that it is in either zone 1 or 2 the maximum 
aggressive ratio is reached and held until such latter time a s 
the "Average" rises above the fourth zone . Likewise when the 
level of the sixth or seventh zone is reached t h e maximum de-
fens! ve ratio •. is held until the "Average" declines to below 
zone 4. The following investment timetable illustrates the 
different zones and the various ratios prevBning in each. 
Three separate schedules are available to show appropriate 
divisions in various zones for plans with 90110, 80/20, 
and 70/,30 maximum and minimum stock proportions . 
Table IV a 
Investment Timetable--Seven Step Formula ~ 
D: Defensive • Agressive 
Zone "Ind. Average" 
Plan 1 
90D- 90A 
Plan 2 Plan 3 
90D-90A 90D-90A 
7 I 90110 80/20 70/30 
255 
2 6 4 
6 I 
222 
80{20 70130 65/35 
221 
5 I 65/35 60/40 51/43 
116 
192 
4 I 50/50 50/50 50/50 
168 
167 
3 I 35165 40/60 
146 
145 
2 I 20/80 30/70 35/65 
127 
128 
1 I 10/90 20/80 
*18. pp. 121-1 ~If 
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D. Comparison with Other Market Averages and Indexes 
Although the Dow~Jones Industrial Average has the 
distinction of being the oldest stock market indicator it is 
by far not the only one. In fact the number of similar indi-
cators are today legions, since every financial publication 
has devised itw own index. However, it will be the purpose 
of this section to treat only those indicators which are most 
widely in use and by their construction can be used as a basis 
"f'or comparison with the "Industrial Average." The study will 
be directed to reveal two major points: 1. The differences in 
composition and computation between other indicators and the 
subject ; 2. The divergence or similarity as the case may be in 
reporting the activities of the stock market. Those averages 
to be treated are the ones published by the ~~Times, 
the Herald Tribune, Standard and Foors and the Security ~ 
Emchange Commission. 
The ~ York Times Ind~strial Stock Average started 
before World War I in 1911. It is presently composed of 
25 industrial stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
and is computed in the same manner as the "Industrial Average". 
The member stocks of the Times Average are for the most part 
the same as the components of the "Industrial Average", this 
fact is true for all the indicators studied in tbis section. 
The method of computation is the simple arithmetic type, but 
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adjustments for split ups and changes in composition are made 
by using multipliers instead of a changing divisor. This 
policy sas adapted during the 1930's when it was necessary 
in the interests of consistency to off set the many stock 
splits occurring in that period. The Times has tried to 
eliminate as many multipliers as possible by switching to 
other securities of equivalent value, but at present it is 
still necessary to multiply the daily price of American 
Tobacco by 2; International Harvister by 12; Aaarican Can by 
6; Dupont by 14; and Air Reduction by 9. It is interesting to 
note that if the five above issues should move one point in 
one direction and the other 20 issues move one point in the 
opposite way, the average would move with the five issues 
rather than with the twenty.;!-
The ~ York Herald Tribune Industrial Average was 
first published on January 1, 1923, based on the prices of 
70 industrial stocks. The indmvidual components contain 
15 manufacturing companies, 10 oils, 8 utilities, 6 steels, 
7 coppers, 4 equipments , 5 department stores, 10 motors, and 
5 foods. It also employs the arithmetic method of computation. 
The average was devised with the basic contention that 25 or 
30 issues could no longer adequately represent the market as 
e. whole. The stock listed and traded are of such a great 
~~36, p. 1911. 
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variety and there are many large companies in an industry so 
that no one issue can adequately represent an entire group. 
Like the Times the Tribune uses a different method of adjust-
ment for changes in composition, stock split ups, and t he like. 
Their procedure is termed the additive syste~ under this method 
when a split occurs the offsetting entry is to add a like num-
ber of the same stocks depending on the nature of the split. 
s a result of this procedure if there were a complete drop 
in the market so that each and every security listed went to 
zero, the average would still be 60. ~!-
The Standard end Poors Daily Composite Average was 
first published in 1928 and is composed of 50 industrials, 
20 rails and 20 utilities. However, it is in reality an 
index rather than an average. Until now the terms index and 
average have been used interchangeably. For instance the 
Dow-Jones Industrial Average is merely a series of the average 
of the prices of its components. If the "Average" rises or 
falls, this means nothing relatively, that is, when the "Aver -
age" is $75 a rise or decline of 5 points cannot be compared 
with a similar occurrence when it is $160 . On the other hand 
an index gives the average of relative changes with reference 
to a base taken at loo_.. The f'o llowing table illustrates 
the difference . 
*4, pp. 336-337. 
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Stocks Base P·rice Index Present :Price Present Index 
A 50 100 75 150 
B 75 100 100 133.33 
G 125 100 150 120. 
Average 83.33 100 108.33 134.44 
The present index is therefore 134.44--the base price 100 
plus the average of the increase of the stocks employed in the 
index. The average, however, only registers the absolute 
change in terms of dollars--an increase of $25 from 83.33 
to 108.33. The really significant figure is not merely the 
increase of one average over another, but the average of 
relative increases which provides a ready base of comparisons.* 
The Standard and Poors indicator is not only a true 
index, but it is also weighted as opposed to the other averages 
which are unweighted; since they make no allowances for the 
number of shares outstanding of the member components. Stan-
dard and Poors takes the closing price of each issue and 
multiplies it by the number of shares outstanding of that 
particular company and thus obtains the computed market value 
of the entire issue. The aggregate market vel ue of all the 
member issues is then expressed as a percentage of the cor-
responding base period (1935-193'9} average values. Stock 
dividends and splits do not effect the continuity since 
shares outstanding are increased accordingly and the price 
becomes proportionately low. Other changes such as in the 
li s t of components or in capitali5ation necessiate a change 
-~ 4, pp • 38-39 • 
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in the weighting fa~tor and an offsetting adjustment to the 
base value • .zl-
The most recent addition to the ranks of reliable 
indicators is that Index published by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, as of April 7, 1951. .At present it 
is only a weekly publication and thus not directly compar-
able with other daily averages treated here. In s cop 
and method it is very similar to Standard and Poors. It 
includes 265 separate stock issues containing six groups--
mining, transportation, utilities, trade, finance, and 
service . The shares selected accounted for 65% of the 
volume and value of all tradeins in its respective in-
dustry in 1949. Each stock is weighted according to the 
number of shares outstanding and the weekly closing prices 
are expressed as a percentage of a base value--1939:100. 
The index has been computed back to 1949 so that figures 
are available since that time.-,'\-i} 
Now that the various averages or indexes have been 
examined it will be interesting to see how they reacted to 
various stock market activity. Comparing the date of the 
high and low points of the various indicators for the 20 
year period 1930-1950 (except the S.E.C. Index) reveals a 
high degree of co·rrelation as shown on the next page • 
..Z:-4, p . 341. 
-1!--:!-32' p. 128. 
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able V. ·~ 
Comparison of Dates of Annual High Points of Industrial Averages 
Year Dow-Hones(30} N.Y. Time s{25} Stand. & Poors(~) N.Y. Trib.{70} 
1930 April 17 
" 1931 Feb . 24 
1932 Mar. 8 
1933 July 8 
1934 Apr . 20 
1935 Nov. 19 
1936 Nov . 19 
193? Mar. 10 
1938 Nov. 12 
1939 Sept. 12 
1940 Je.n. 3 
1941 Jan 10 
1942 Dec. 26 
1943 July 14 
1944 Dec. 16 
1945 Dec. 11 
1946 May 29 
1947 July 24 
1948 June 15 
1949 Dec. 30 
1950 Nov. 24 
April 10 
Feb. 24 
Feb. 19 
July 17 
Feb. 5 
Nov . 20 
Nov. 18 
Jan. 22 
Nov. 10 
Sept. 13 
Jan. 3 
Jan. 10 
Dec. 28 
July 15 
Dec. 16 
Dec~ 11 
June 10 
~Tuly 14 
June 14 
Dec. 30 
Oct. 9 
Table 
April 10 
Feb. 26 
Sept. 8 
July 18 
Feb. 5 
Nov. 29 
Nov. 9 
Mar. 10 
Nov. 12 
Sep t. 13 
Jan. 3 
Jan. 10 
Dec. 26 
July 14 
July 12 
Dec. 10 
May 29 
Feb. 8 
June 15 
Dec. 30 
Nov. 24 vr ·· _ 
April 10 
Feb . 21 
Mar . 8 
July 18 
Feb. 5 
Nov . 20 
Nov . 18 
Mar. 10 
Nov. 10 
Oct. 26 
Jan. 4 
Jan . 10 
Nov .. 9 
July 14 
Dec. 30 
Dec. 10 
May 31 
Feb. 8 
June 14 
Dec. 30 
Dec. 28 
Comp arison of Dates of Annua~ Low Points of Industrial Averages 
1930 Dec. 16 
1931 De~. 17 
1932 July 8 
1933 Feb. 27 
1934 July 26 
1935 Mar . 14 
1936 Apr . 29 
1937 Nov. 24 
1938 Mar, 31 
1939 Apr . 8 
194o- June 10 
1941 Dec. 23 
1942 Apr. 28 
1943 Jan. 8 
1944 Feb. 7 
1945 Jan. 24 
1946 Oct. 9 
1947 May 17 
1948 Mar. 16 
1949 June 13 
1950 Jan. 13 
~~4' pp • 348-350 
Dec. 17 
Dec. 19 
July 8 
Mar. 2 
July 26 
Mar. 18 
Apr . 30 
Nov. 2 4 
Mar. 31 
Apr~ 11 
June 10 
Dec. 23 
Apr. 29 
Jan. 8 
Feb. 7 
Jan. 24 
Oct. 30 
May 17 
Mar. 16 
June 13 
Jl\[ly 13 
Dec. 17 
Dec. 5 
June 2 
Feb. 27 
July 26 
Mar. 18 
Jan. 6 
Oct . 19 
Mar , 31 
Apr . 11 
June 10 
Dec. 23 
Apr . 28 
Jan. 2 
Feb . 7 
Jan. 28 
Nov. 22 
May 17 
Feb. 11 
June 14 
Jan. 13 
Dec. 19 
Dec. 17 
July 8 
Mar. 2 
July ;::;6 
Mar. 18 
Apr. 30 
No v . 23 
Ma1 ... 31 
Apr. 11 
May 21 
Dec. 10 
.Apr . 28 
Jan. 2 
·Jan. 3 
Jan. 24 
Oct. 10 
May 19 
Feb. 11 
June 14 
July 13 
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A look at the perc~ntage rise and decline of the 
long s wings of the averages during the major movement s from 
1929 to 1950 also reveals some pert inent facts . The Tribune 
Average seemed to flucuate less then the other three. Standard 
and Poors, New York Times and Dow-Hone s are in close agreement 
in measuring the extent of the decline s, and do not disagree 
radically in measuring the rises. The following table is ·the 
basis for the above observat i ons. 
Tabl e VII 
Relative Long Swing Changes in Prices of Stocks--1929-l950 ~i-
Dow-Jones N.Y. Times N. Y. Herald Stand. & Poors 
'P er cent decline 
1920 high to low ••• 89.2 87.7 56.5 86 .1 
Per cent rise 1932 
low to 1937 liigh •• 371.6 314.3 68.0 413 . 7 
?er cent decline 
1937 high to 1938 
low ••.••.••••.•••• 49.1 47.9 26.9 53.6 
Per cent rise 1938 
low to 1939 high ••• 57.6 62.5 18.9 55.3 
? er cent decline 
1 '3 39 h igh to 1942 
low •••••••••••••••• 40.4 45.2 16.6 42 .3 
Per cent rise 1942 
l ow to 1946 high •• l23.7 110.8 43 .3 145.5 
?er cent decline 
1946 high to 1949 
low •••••••••••• •••• 24.0 27 . 7 13.8 28.9 
Per cent rise 1949 
low to 1950 high ••• 45.7 49 . 0 16.7 57.2 
Comparison of day to day flucuations is shovm by 
examining t he period April 25, to June 25, 1935--55 days 
when pronounced flucuations ·either up or dovm was experienced. 
~~4, p. 351. 
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This period of relatively no activity was chosen i n order 
to determine whi ch indicator showed the greatest movement when 
t he market was on the whole steady. In the first place, all 
four aver ages were in agreement on 51 out of 51 days a s to 
which way the market moved . On two occassions the Tribune 
disputed direction with the others. On a third occassion the 
. . ,
Dow-Jones Industrial Average constituted the minorit y and on 
a fourth one showed no change, one showed a decline, and the 
other two showed rised. The Tribune flucuated least for the 
period studi ed. The spread of its high and low for 55 days 
was 3 .. 5% of its median price as compared with spread of 9 .5% 
by Dow-Jones 1 8.8% for Times, and 8 . 9% for Standard and Poors. 
The following table summarizes the results. 
Table VIII. 
Average Daily J:t,lucuations of Indicators, A;eril 25 to June 29, 1939~:-
Averages Points Percentage 
Dow-Jones 0.96 0.71 
Tribune .34 . 24 
Times 1.05 .61 
Standard & Poors .91 .82 
The followine page contains the graphs of Standard 
and Poors, the New York Herald, and the New York Times stock 
market i ndicators from 1941 to the present. These can be 
compared with the graph of the Dow- Jones Industrial Average 
for the same period by refering to page ____ • 
-!}4, p. 351. 

-59-
4. Major Cri ticism.s of the Average 
A. Method of Computing i nadequate 
The previous chapters have studied the "Average" from 
the time of its inception to the present period under surveil-
ance. Similar market barometers and the theory from which 
the "Average" evolved have also been e~amined. Now it is 
time to study the ttAverage" critically with a view to dis -
covering its major defects. 
A frequent comment concerning. the "Average" is that 
for present day uses, its method of computation is inadequate. 
As ha.s been developed rather fully, a. simple arithmetic pro -
cess with a constant divisor is employed. This constant di-
visor has been changed m~ times for ·various reasons, since 
it was first adopted. It started at 12.7 in 1928 and except 
for a short period has constantly been on the down grade until 
it is now 6.16. Thus if every stock in the "Industrial 
Average" gained one point under a simp le arithmetic compu-
tation, you would expect the "Average" to increase one 
point also. However, applied to the present "Average" and 
its extremely low divisor a rise of 4.87 points would occur 
(30 divided by 6.16}. Each days gains or losses are conse-
qnently magnified fivefold as a result .-l:-
~-38' p. 
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When a split occurs in an issue a~ adjustment is 
made in the divisor and the same average is obtained as ex-
isted on the old basis. However, any good statistician 
could demonstrate that as the market then move s on to 
higher or l ower levels, the new divisor does not continue 
to give the same answer as the old divisor, and the previous 
combination of stocks would have given. For instance, before 
Allied Chemical was split four for ine in August, 1950, the 
stock appeared on the Dow-Jones list at a price above 200. 
At that time a divisor of 8.57 was in use. Suddenly Allied 
appeared on the market at around 56 for the new stock and a 
divisor of 7 .76 was adopted . The change does not give the 
same answer at· the time of the split, but as the market 
moves on to other levels and as different components of the 
"Average" change in price a distortion creeps into the pic -
ture. Such distortions attributed to any one split is not 
very great , but as one split after another occurs the cumu-
lative effect becomes quire real.* 
I n the period from 1939 to April, 1952, all but eight 
of the 30 component stocks have been split. This naturally 
has lowered the divisor, but the real impact is that at the 
time of the JJplit the "Averagen retains one share of the new 
stock and sells the others resulting fro~ t he splits. With 
-~t-40 ' p .. 387. 
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the proceeds from the sale, it reinvests the amount in the 
other 30 sto·cks on a pro-rata basis. Instead of increasing 
its holdings of a split stock it cut them down, which es-
sentially results in an adjustment in ~averse. For each share 
of the eight members in the "Average" that have not been 
split there are now 2! shares. On the other hand members 
that have been spl it are repre sented with less than ~ shar~ 
now, as compared with 1939 . The entire effect on the "Aver-
age" is shown by the following reprint of the study. 
Tab~e IX, 
Dow-Jones Industrial Average 1939-April 1950 
For each share of following eight stocks in the 
average in 1939--there were 2. 3124 share s in the average 
in April of 1952" • • •••• 
AC, T, AT, CFG, GE, GFm N, Z (These are the 
stocks having no splits} 
Dropping the divisor ased by Dow in computation 
the average(from 15 . 1 in 1939 to 6 . 53 now (April, 1952) is 
tantamount to increasing the holdings of each 1939 share to 
2.3124 shares--15.1 divided by 6 . 53 equals 2 . 3124 . 
Similar computations for the other 22 stocks show: 
No. of Shares in Dow-
Jones Ind. Avg. Dec . 1939 
No. 1939 Eq"t}:i-
valent shares 
in Dow-Jones 
Ind. Avg . Dec. 1951 
Jones Ind . Avg. Dec. 1939 Stock Swmbol (and splits) 
n 
n 
" .. 
" tt 
" 
UR ( spli t 6 for 5) • • •••••••• • •• 1 . 9270 
PG (split 1 ~5 for 1} ••••••••••• 1.5416 
C, GM,GT,SD,TX, (split 2 f'or 1} • • 1.15£>2 
AR (split 2.4 for 1} •• • ••• ••• •• • .• 9633 
BS, HR, .TIVI,LW ,DR, NS, UK, (split for ~.7708 
ACD, DP,S, WX (split 4 for 1} •••••• 5781 
EK (split 5 for 1) ••••••• • ••• • •• •• • 4625 
Computed by taking 5/6 of 2 . 3124. 
,. 
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Practical Verification ££Weights Cited ~Previous Table 
Dow-Jones Industrial Average 
Market value 
of 1 sh of 
each 12/30/39 
Market value 
of one 1939 
sh of each 
12/31/51 
30 Dow-Jones 
Stocks 
Market value 
weighted No. of 
shs. 12/31/51 
$ 599.375 
46.75 
66.00 
280.25 
50.75 
~98.25 
560.375 
166.875 
$2,268 .. 625 
8 stocks not split in 1939-51 
$591.75 AC,T, AT , CFG, GE, BF, N,Zw 
Value of 2.3124 shares of 
each times 591.75 •••••••••••• $1,368.36 
split 1.2 for 1 (20% stock div.} 
37.95 United Aircraft--Value of 
1.9270 shs (1 .9270 times 37.95 73~3 
split 1.5 for 1 
99.75 Proctor & Gamble--Value at 1.5411 
share (1.5416 times $99.75 •••••• 153.77 
6 stocks split 2 for 1 
697.50 C,GM, GT, SD, J, TX-value 
of 1.1562 shares of each 
(1.1562 times $697.50 } •••••••••• 806.45 
split 2.4 for 1 (combination 
of 6 for 5 in 47 and 2 for 1 
in 45} 
114.30 American Smelting--Value of 
9633 shares (.9633 times 11430).110.11 
8 stocks split 3 for 1 
1,087~0 BS, HR,~1,LW,DR,NS,UK,X-
value of .7708 times 1.087.50} •• 838.24 
4 stocks split 4 for 1 
1,053.50 ACD,DD,S,WX--value of .5781 share s 
of each (.5781 times 1053.50} ••• 609. 03 
split 5 for 1 
230 . 00 Eastman Kodak--value of .4625 
shares (.4625 times 230.00 ) ••••• 106 .395 
• • • • • Total • • • $4 ,065.460 
$2,268.625 divided by 15.1 equal 150.24--Dow-Jones 
published average for Dec. 30, 1939 
$4,065.460 divided by 15.1 equal 269.23--Dow-Jones 
published average for Dec. 31, 1951* 
·~·36 11 p o 1936" 
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Futhermore the method of computation makes no allow-
ance for the relative size and importance of different compa-
nies used in the compilations. That is no matter how many 
shares a corporation has outstanding it is given equal 
weight in determining t he "Average". For example, on more 
than one occassion General Fodds end General Motors have 
both been selling at $50 a share. These are two of the 
thirty stocks that mrure up the "Average". Thus a one 
point rise in the price of General Foods has just the same 
effect as a one point change in General Motors. Yet GIVI 
h as outstanding approximately 82 million common shares as 
against 5~ million GF, General Motr s equity is valued by 
the market at $4,300 million, Gener~l Foods at $298 million. 
The relative importance of the two looked at from this 
angle is almost 16 to 1 in favor of General Motors. This 
fact however, makes no difference in the weighting of the 
Another criticism is that no adjustment of any 
kind is made for the issuance of rights or stock dividends 
by the components of the "Average". Yet the actual inves-
tor is definetely concerned with the question of rights and 
divididends fQr . they have a direct bearing on the results 
hew ill obtain. For example on May 31, 1929, U.s. Steel 
sold for 175 , next day as a result of a 10% stock dividend 
the price dropped markedly. Thus forcing the "Average" to 
. ?}40, p • 387. 
r 
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be reduced to some extent, yet no correcting factor •as 
introduced at the time .* Moreover, no adjustment was made 
for the value of American Telephone and Telegraph rights 
to buy bonds on two o'cc assions, nor for stock dividends 
of Corn Froducts 5% in 1951, Eastman Kodak in 1950 end 
10% in 1951, Standard Oil of California 5% in 1949 and 
1950, etc . ·~·~} 
This method of computing has so distorted the 
"Averagen that is now almost physically impossible to in~ 
vest in a replica of the "Indus trial Average". You would 
of course have to buy the 30 stocks i nvo l ved, but to have 
it react simultaneously with the "Average" is another thing. 
For example you would have to put twice as much in American 
Telephone and Telegraph as i n General Motors, twice as much 
in American Can as u.s. Steel etc. Then if one of the 
stocks has a three for one split you would have to sell 
two thirds of your holdings of that particular issue and 
use the proceeds to buy a pro-rate. amount of each of the 
remaining 29 . stocks . ~H~i~ 
B. Scope Too Narrow 
The second major· ciriticism is ·!tihat.·:'t -he :. ave r ag e in 
its scope is too narrow. It contains but 30 issues to 
~!-2 4, p. 33. 
i{~f-40' p·. 387 . 
~HH!-39, p • 1133 • 
• ,.. 
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represent on exchange which lists upwards of 1500 shares. 
one author has described "It" "As a ratio arbitraril}f calcu-
lated and frequently adjusted of the price performance of 
29 blue chip industrials and one utility of exceptional 
performance.~~-" 
It has also been termed as an " avidity index". In 
an inflationary period like our present one where more mnd 
more individuals have investable funds and have less faith 
in fixed income securities, there is an increased reliance 
on common stocks to offset the declining purchasing power 
of the dollar. In part these individuals have been sold 
the idea that investment trusts are a situs for securities. 
Likewise investment, by pension funds have growing as a 
result of high employment and the formulation of new plans. 
Insurance assets are also growing due to the need for 
greater gro ss amounts of insurance. Due to charter, state 
laws, and other requirements these institutions are compelled 
to overide their liquidity preference in order to maintain 
a substantially fully invested position. Some executives 
of these fi:flms feel that inflation will contine for quitte 
some time and thus are fully invested. However, the majority 
of officers of trust funds, pension funds, insurance companies 
arid the like have read the other side of the coin and feel 
we are near a bull market peak. Therefore they compromise 
-:i-40' p . 387. 
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between the two positions and buy only the market "leaders". 
The "leaders" are common stocks of companies considered to be 
the least effected by the economic swings of the business 
cycle. They are usually referred to as blue chips and it is 
easily seen that the majority of Dow-Jones stocks are of 
this type . 
The positive and obvious argument is that the price 
advance of "leaders" recently exceeds the price advance of 
stocks on the New York Stock Exchange as a whole. For ex-
ample, suppose xyz represents a stock exchange blue chip. 
Investment tnust "A" sells 10,000 shares and fund "B" buys 
15,600 shares during the same period. This results in in-
creasing the price of xyz du~. to the dominance of demand 
over supply. It provides "A" with say capital · gains of lO :Jb 
whic h keeps up the dividends to the owners of the trusts, 
and "Bn .is lauded for investing in a dominant firm wnose 
price is rising. Al though the percentage of xyz owned by 
trust funds, insurance companies, etc . is rela tiveiy a 
small percentage of the total shares outstanding, the . 
scope and effort of their transactions in the shares are 
great. In a limited amount of time perhaps a month, the de-
mand on the part of these institutions may dominate the market 
in this particular stock due to the presslire of more and more 
investable funds, and as the result of a number of indep endent 
· traders who join the so-called " band wagon". So the business 
man, the financier, the investor, etc. who buys and sells 
t 
. 
r 
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stocks like XYZ due to their belief in expansion or contrac-
tion of this or related businesses, no longer controls the 
demand and supply of XYZ and similar issues. As a conse-
quence of the changed factors of supply and demand the 
"Industrial Avere.ge" which is loaded with nleadersn is no 
longer a forecaster of business conditions. It is an "index 
of avidity" lj.sed by executives of trusts, pensions, etc. who 
feel compelled to purchase these leaders with gradually ac-
cumulating dollar reserves c aused by inflationary prices and 
associated factors.* 
It is also claimed that the "Average" is failing 
to keep up with times in not representing the new industries 
and by not recognizing new leaders in established fields. 
Basically the "Average" is fairly well balanced as to industry 
representation, but that it restricts its selection to just 
the largest companies in the industry. A study made in 
July, 1951, excluding railroads and railroad equipment 
groups--revealed that there were 96% common stock issues 
listed having a total market value of over $92 billions. 
These stocks are divided into 26 industry groups of which 
Dow-Jones falls in 17. The groups not represented in the 
"Average" are financial, leather products, office equipment, 
paper and publishing, real estate, shipbuilding and operation, 
textiles, U.S. companies operating abroad, a..l'ld m.icellaneous. 
The table on the next page depicts the details of the study. 
*39 1 p • 133. 
, 
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Table X. 
Indu strial Deversification of Dow- Jones Industrials and 'l1hose 
Listed .£.!! the New York--st'ock Exchange July 31, 1951 
(railroad and railroad equipment groups omi tted) 
Stocks Stk . Exch Dow-Jones Stk. Exch • 
EZcl. Uhil. Excl. A.T&T. Incl. Util. 
Aircraft 
Amusement 
Automobive 
Building 
Trade 
Chemical 
Electriaal 
Equip. 
Farm Mach. 
Finane i a.l 
Food Prods . 
& Bev. 
Leather & 
8.4 
1.5 
19 . 3 
3.4 
1.2 
2 .4 
5.2 
its Prods . 0.4 · 
Mach. & 
Metals 
Mining 
Of . Equip. 
Paper & 
Publ . 
:Petrolemm 
3.7 
4 .1 
1.3 
2.1 
& Nat. Gas23.o· 
Real Est . 0.4 
Retail Trade 6 .3 
Rubber 1 . 1 
Shipbuild. 
& Oper 0 .2 
Steel & !Iron ~. 6 
Textile 2 . 1 
Tobacco 1.6 
Utilities • •• 
Misc. 1.2 
U.s . Op er . 
Abroad 
Foreign 
Companies 
1 . 5 
2.5 
1.8% 
1.0 
7.0 
3.8 
21.3 
5.7 
2.0 
• • • 
9 .0 
• • • 
7.0 
5.3 
• • • 
••• 
10 . 2 
• • • 
6.0 
5.5 
• • • 8.4 
• • • 
3.8 
• • • 
• • • 
. . . 
2 .2 
l.O% 
1.1 
7 .1 
1.3 
16.4 
2.9 
1.0 
2.0 
4.4 
0.3 
3 . 2 
3.5 
1 .1 
1.8 
19 .5 
0.3 
5 . 4 
0.9 
0.2 
3.9 
1 . 8 
1 . 3 
15.2 
1.0 
1.3 
2.1 
Dow-Jones 
Incl. A.T . &T. 
l. 7ib 
0.9 
6.4 
3. 5 
19.4 
5.2 
1 . 8 
• • • 
8 . 2 
• • • 
6.3 
4 . 8 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
5 . 5 
5.1 
• • • 
7. 9 
• •• 
3.4 
8 . 8 
. . . 
• • • 
2 .0 
Note : The New York Stock Exchange industry percentages are 
based on the total value of all listed common shares in each 
gro~p~ While t he Dow-Jones is computed on the basis of one 
share of ea.ch of the thirty stocks~.;:-
c. Domination ~ Leaders 
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Not only is the nAveragen too narrow in its scope, but 
within its confine s it is dominated by l eaders . This prevents the 
"Average" from dipic t ing accurately the stocks that compose it. 
let a lone the en tire market. For example as ment ioned earl ier on 
a certain day the ttindustrial Average" showed a decline of le42, 
yet the market seemed to undergo only functional changes. It 
was latter discovered that 1 . 09 points of the decline was caused 
by a drop o.f some 5 points in Allied Chemical selling for over 
$ 200 a share and a few other high price stocks. The rest of 
the industrial li s t therefore declined only .33 cents . Thus 
the "A.veragen did not move with the greater majority of the com-
-ponents, but with a few high price shares .-r.-~~o 
In reviewing the market action of t he 30 stocks comprising 
the "Average" for the period December 31, 1948, --July 31, 1951, 
one writer points out that on the whole the components did not 
fair as well as the nAveragen itself. The study divides the 
period into four phases--the year, 1949, 1950, seven months 
of 1951 (an independent up to date anal ysis of this type is 
presented in Chapter 5). 
*41, pp . 1355-13 91 • 
.;B:-37, p . 1408~ 
t 
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Table XI. 
Gains In Industrial Average As Compared With Thirty Oomnonent 
StoCKs ----
1949 1950 7 ms. of 1951 12/31/t48--7/31/51 
Gain in Indus. 12.9% 17.7% 9.5% 45.4% 
Avg . --Act. of 
30 Components 
Stocks with gains 16 17 11 16 
above Avg . 
Stocks with gains 9 5 10 13 
below Avg . 
Stocks showing 5 8 9 1 · 
decline 
Only three stocks--Dupont, N.ational Distillers, and 
Texas Co. did better thah the "Industrial Average" for all 
four periods. Ten stocks outperformed the "Average" for three 
out of four periods--Allied Chemicals, American Smelting, 
Goodyear, General Motors , Johns Manville, Procter and Gamble, 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, Union Carbide, United Aircraft, and 
u. S. Steel. Eight stocks failed to do as well as the "Average" 
in three out of four periods--American Tobacco, Cb¥Yslar, Corn 
Products, General Foods; International Nickle, Lowes, Sears 
Roibuck, and Standard Oil of California. American Telephone 
and Telegraph, Eastman Kodak, International Harvester, ~~d 
Woolworth did worse than the "Average" in all four periods 
between December , 1948, and July, 1951. The table on the 
following page gives the details of the study. 
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in September, 1943, with the surrender of Italy . By 1944 it was 
evident that the Allied Armies from the west and the Russian 
Armies of the East would sooB overcome Germany. The stock 
market started its own offensive about t h i s t ime and prices 
that had been s t ationary for the past two years begain to move. 
Germany surrendered in April while Japan capitulated in August 
of l 94E,. The stock exchange continued. its upward movement which 
di d not reach its peak until Ma:i 1946 , when the " veragen achieved 
what wEts to be one of its many highs for the ten year and six 
·month phase, registering 213. The post - war years were character-
ized by increased civilian production, i nfl ation, and predictions 
of an impending depression . The ensuing cold war plus fear of 
severe reprecussions from soaring prices caused stocks to de-
cline, until the "Average" reached its second low for the period 
of Jtu1e of 1949 at 161 . 
Ou~ entrance into the Korean War in late June of 1950 
dispelled for the present a.t least any fears of depression. The 
stock market acted accordingly, spurred on by increased defense 
spending. By February, 1951, when most stocks were reputed to 
be at their high for the current per iod , the "Average" c l imbed 
to 258 in that month . The market cont inued to prosper under 
favorable condi t ions as the "Average" rea ched its high point for 
the ten year and s!x month span at 281 in August of 1952.. I t 
is pert inent to note at this t i me that the "Average" did rise as 
.. 
• 
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high as "293" by the end of 1952 due to a post-election rise. 
However, this will in no way affect the accuracy of this since 
the years covered are entirely representative of this ~resent 
period. ·-The graph on t he next page depicts the path of t he 
verage from its l ow i n July, 1952 t o the present period (Nov ~l952 • 
B. Statistical Study--950 Stocks 
A statistical study of this kind has to the authors 
knowledge never been conducted and thus should be of marked 
significance to those employing the "Average". The proc edure 
and details of the analysis were evolved with the aid of Profes-
sor Douglas Bellemore of Boston University and the Americ~1 
Institute of Finance, and Mr . Charles Norris, also of the 
American I n stitute. Basically the problem was simple. That 
is, to compare the action of the "Industrial Averagen with that 
of the stock market for the period in question.. Ideally it 
wou ld have been best to study ever sto ck (some 1600 i n number} 
l i sted on the New York Stock Exchange, however, this was im-
practical, so a compromise was effected where a representative 
sample of issues would be treated. The next thing to do was to 
find a convenient source for the information and to decide what 
constituted a representative sample . The source chased was the 
magazin~ Granhic Stocks published by F. w. Stephens of New York. 
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The sample chosen was the 950 common stocks treated in the 
"Magazine". -l~ 
Graphic stocks is one of the best known magazines of 
its tJ~Pe pr•inted for the use of the business world. The "Magazine" 
contains lOOl charts (950 excluding preferred issues} showing 
the monthly high and low points of the most active stocks listed. 
on the New York Stock and American Exchanges for a.n eleven year 
period. The capitalizations are brought up to date and stocks 
which have been split or reo~€anized are adjusted to compensate 
for the changes,.-lf-~ In order to make the study more meaningful 
and at the same time more comprehensive it was resolved, not 
only to exsmine the absolute period, but several sub-sections 
of it. Log;ically these intermediate points were designated at 
times when t he 11 Industl"ial Average" experienced pronounced high 
or low readings as evidenced by the first section of this chapter. 
In tbi s manner three such points were selected bringing to a 
total of five the dates when the prices of stocks chosen and 
the "Indus trial Average" would be recorded . The dates se-
lected, inc:luding the maximum high and minimum low points of 
the "Avere.e:e" for the per iod, are as follows : April, 1942, Low 
(mini~um}; May, 1946, High, June, 1949 Low, February, 1951, 
High, and ~lugust, 1952, High (maximum}. 
*43, introc~ction. 
~~-:~45 and 4€;. 
j 
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Specifically the study was conducted in the following manner: 
1~ The prices of the 950 stocks were recorded for the 
five dates mentioned above (April, '42, May, ' 46 , June , 1 49, 
February, '51 and August, '52} in accordance with the "Indus -
trial Average{. on those particular date s . For example, April, 
'42 was a low point for the "Average" , therefore the values of the 
stocks were also recorded at their low point; May , '46 was a high 
point for the "Average" so the stocks were recorded at their highs 
for that month , etc . 
2. The same procedure was repeated for tba "Dow-Jones 
Industrial Aver age. " 
3. The respective values of the 950 stocks recorded in 
ugust, 1952, were designated as end points since they were 
the latest in time. The percentage increases or decreases of 
the stocks between the four other dates and the end point were 
then calculated and recorded. For example, consider stock A•-
the percentage change in its value for April, ' 42 to August '52 
was computed, the percentage change in its value from May, ' 46 
to August, 1 52 , was computed, ~tkewise between June, '49 and Aug-
ust, 1 52. Thi s treatment of Stock A was repeated for the remaining 
949 issues. 
4 . The same procedure was rep.eated for the "Dow-Jones 
Industrial ,Average". (note: Due to the fact that vaLues were 
read manually from charts, all prices and percentage fi&ures 
for the sake of continuity of accuracy, were recorded at their 
nearest whole number ~ 


Dow-Jones Ind. Avg . 93 213 161 258 281 202 32 75 109 
American Chain & Cable 16 39 20 31 29 81 -26 45 l.o6 
American Chicle 25 53 40 45 47 88 -11 17 04 
American Colortype 4 33 16 22 16 3().0 
-51 0 -27 
Am. Crystal Sugar 15 ~9 14 29 24 60 -17 71 -:1.7 
American Cyanamid 15 31 20 43 55 26S 71 175 28 
Americ an Distil . 13 . 72 30 57 36 176 -50 20 -33 Am. Ecnasutic Tiling 1 10 5 8 7 600 -30 40 - 13 Am. European Sec . 4 23 16 18 33 730 44 106 72 American Export Lines 12 24 15 22 18 50 -24 20 07 Am. & Foreign Power 1 12 2 2 10 900 -17 400 40_0 Am Gas & Else . 16 49 40 55 59 269 21 48 07 
.Am . Hawaiian SS 36 55 34 46 51 43 -07 50 11 Am. Hide & Leather 2 13 3 8 4 100 -70 33 -50 Am. Home Pr oduc ts 12 41 27 32 39 2QS -05 45 22 Amer. Ic e Co. 2 18 6 8 '8 300 -54 33 0 Aml International 3 15 112 17 23 667 63 91 21 Am. Investment 5 12 13 19 23 360 91 77 21 Am. Laundry Mach. 20 46 20 27 28 40 -39 40 04 PUn. Locomotlve 8 40 12 24 21 162 -48 75 -13 Amer . Mach . & Foundry 10 40 11 17 24 140 -40 13 42 Amer. Mach. & Metals 4 24 5 12 16 300 -33 ~20 33 Amer. Maracaibo Co . 1 5 3 7 6 500 20 100 -14 Amer . Metal Co. Ldt. 9 21 11 24 31 244 48 182 29 Amer . Me tal Prdcts . 
- -
7 18 14 
- -~- 100 -22 Amer. Meter Co. 8 19 17 25 26 225 37 553 04 Amer. Molasses Co. 
- - 6 11 8 
- ---
33 -27 Amer. Natural Gas Co. 7 29 22 30 34 386 173 55 13 Amer. New Co. 10 54 38 38 34 240 -37 -11 -11 Amer. Potash & Cham. 44 52 22 38 40 . -09 -23 82 05 Amer . I'ower & Light 1 19 10 22 28 2700 42 180 27 Amer. Radiator & 4 21 10 15 16 300 -21 60 07 Stand. San . 
A.mer. Republics 6 24 22 50 68 1033 163 209 i 36 Amer . Safety Razor l 22 7 9 7 600 -68 o r -22 Amer . Seating 2 13 12 19 23 1050 76 92 21 Amer . Smelt. Refin. 16 30 20 41 46 188 53 130 1 12 Amer. Snuff Co. 28 46 36 4! 38 36 -17 9 6 1 -09 Amer . Steel Found . 16 48 20 36 35 119 -27 75 03 AIDer. Stores Co . 11 40 23 38 41 273 03 78 r 08 Amer. Sugar Refining 16 54 34 70 59 269 09 74 26 Amer. Sumatra Tobaccor 6 20 16 23 13 117 -35 -3:3\ -42 Amer. Tel & Tel 116 200 138 159 154 33 -23 131 - 01 Amer. Tobacco Co. 41 100 66 69 58 41 -42 -12 -16 

i:>'l'Uli.t\.i:> J. "=:: v - 4 b 6 7 8 9 
Dow Jones Ind. Avg. 93 213 161 258 281 202 75 75 09 
B~goor::- & Aroostook RR 40 28 14 26 23 475 
-11 64 -12 
Barber Oil 5 58 38 71 54 980 -07 42' - 24 
Barium Steel Corp 1 12 3 8 9 800 -25 200 12 
Barker Bros. Corp 2 42 16 24 17 750 -59 06 -29 
Bath Ifon Worka 13 33 10 25 22 69 -33 120 -12 
Bayuk Cigars 8 32 11 12 10 ·25 -69 09 -17 
Beatrice Foods 10 34 21 36 39 ' 290 15 86- - 08 
Beaunit Mills 2 40 13 34 21 950 -48 54 -38 
Beech Aircraft Corp . 7 20 7 13 16 129 · -20 129 23 
Beech-nut Packing 18 40 ~- 33 30 67 -25 -12 -08 Belding Heminway Co. 6 26 12 19 12 100 -5 4 0 -37 
Bell Aircraft Corp. 2 15 6 14 !6 700 07 67 14 
Bell & Howell Co. 
- 37 11 23 21 
-
-35 91 - 09 
Bellanca Air6raft 2 8 2 4 4 100 -50 00 0 
Bendix Aviat ion 32 53 26 60 56 75 06 15 -07 
Beneficial Loan Corp. 11 36 22 25 34 209 -06 55 36 
Best & Co. 9 53 23 33 28 211 -47 22 -15 
Best Foods 5 - 32 25 38 33 560 03 32 -13 
Bethlehem Steel 17 37 23 59 53 212 43 30 -10 
B' gelow-Sanford Cafpe t 9 42 22 34 15 67 -64 - 2 -56 
Black & Decker Mfg . 15 46 23 39 36 140 -35 6 · -07 
Blaw-Knox Co. 6 30 11 21 18 2BO -60 2 -14 
Bl i ss (EW) & Company 5 1 4 8 18 19 280 -36 1 8 06 
Bluenthal (SidJ & Co. 3 24 6 14 11 267 - 54 3 -11 
Boeing Airplane 9 20 13 37 37 311 85 1 5 0 
Bohm Aluminum & Brass 16 4S 16 24 24 50 -48 0 0 Bond Store s 7 49 17 19 1 6 129 -67 - 6 -16 Borden Co . 19 57 40 52 54 ' 184 -05 5 04 Borg-Warner 22 82 43 70 76 245 - 07 7 09 Boston & Maine RR 2 9 2 18 14 600 56 6 0 - 22 Bower Roller Bearing 6 21 13 30 28 367 33 1 5 -07 Braniff Airways 
-
31 6 14 12 
-
-61 1 0 -14 
Brazilian Trac. Lt. & Pwr . 3 12 8 13 12 300 0 1 0 -07 Breeze Corp. 4 10 2 10 8 100 -20 3 0 -20 
Bridgeport Bras s Co. 7 19 7 16 20 186 95 1 6 25 
Briggs Mfg. Co. 17 52 21 34 38 124 -27 1 12 Briggs & Stratton 14 45 23 33 35 67 -22 9 0 6 
Briston-Myer s 15 66 35 33 29 93 -57 - 7 -12 
Bri tish American Oil 5 12 10 16 24 380 100 1 0 50 
Brooklyn Union Gas 6 19 13 19 27 350 42 1' 7 42 
Brown-Fpr'man Distillers 1 2 4 6 14 15 1400 -38 1 07 
Brown Rubbers Co. 1 9 5 14 12 1100 -33 -l:4 Brown Shoe 1 5 45 30 54 56 273 24 04 Bruce (E.L. ) Co . 7 25 15 28 23 229 -08 -18 
STQ.CKS 1 2 s, 4 5 6 7 I 8 9 
Dow Jones Industrial Avg. 93 213 161 258 281 29cef _3~ 1.~ 09 Brunswich-Balke-Co11ender 10 37 1 6 23 19 
-17 
Buckeye Pipe Line Co. 8 15 ll 14 16 100 07 45 14 
Bucyrus-Erie 6 25 14 23 27 3 50 08 86 17 
Budd Co. 4 23 8 18 14 250 -39 75 -22 
Bullard Co. 16 45 12 30 39 144 -13 225 30 
Bulove. Watch 11 60 30 47 38 245 -37 27. -19 
Bunker Hill & Sul l ivan 18 a 6 13 23 21 17 -19 54 -09 
Mining 
Burlington Mills 3 20 9 26 18 500 -10 100 -31 
Buroughs Adding Mach . 7 20 13 18 18 143 ~10 38 0 
Burry Biscuit 1 11 2 4 5 400 -55 250 25 
Bush Terminal 3 13 7 14 1 4 367 07 100 0 
But l er Bros. 6 40 6 16 14 133 -65 133 12 
Butte Copp er & Zinc 2 9 3 9 12 500 23 300 33 
Byers A. M. Co . 7 32 17 28 22 21 4 - 31 29 -21 
Byron Jackson 8 39 15 19 23 188 -41 53 21 
Calgary & Ednonton l 2 3 12 15 l L!()O 650 400 25 
Cal. Elec. Pwr . l 13 6 9 10 900 -23 67 09 
Cal . ~acking 10 24 15 32 28 180 17 87 -12 
Callahab Zinc-Lead l 6 l 5 3 200 -50 200 -40 
Calumet & Hecla Cons . Cop. 6 ll 4 11 9 50 -18 125 -18 
Campbell Wyant & Cannon 13 41 16 29 25 92 -39 75 ·-14 
Canada Dry Ging er Al e 3 20 10 13 10 233 - 50 0 - 23 
Cabadain Macaroni 1 3 1 4 5 400 67 400 25 
Canadian Pacific RR · 4 21 10 29 37 825 . 79 270 28 
Cannon Mills Co . 13 36 41 6:J. 54 315 50 32 -11 
Capital Adminstration 11.1.n 2 20 12 22 24 1 100 20 50 09 
Capital Airlines 6 40 6 15 13 117 -61 117 -13 
Carpente r Steel Co . 24 61 26 51 50 108 -18 92 -02 
DarrJGans. Biscuit Co . 1 24 3 5 2 lOO -92 - 33 -60 
Carrier Corp . 5 32 13 22 29 480 -09 123 32 
Casco Pr oducts 2 12 4 6 4 100 - 67 9 -33 
Case ( J. I.} Co . 7 25 15 32 26 271 94 73 -19 
Cat~1in Corp. of Amer . 3 I 20 3 8 7 133 -65 133 ::12 
Catipi1lar Tractor 15 39 27 54 58 287 49 92 37 
Celanese Corp. 6 33 24 57 46 667 28 92 -19 
Celotex Corp. 7 38 14 13 18 143 -53 29 38 
Centr al Aguirre Sugar Co . 16 29 15 20 20 25 -31 33 0 
Central Foundr y Co. 2 17 7 10 8 300 -53 1 4 -20 
Cental R. R. of N. J . 3 18 16 27 22 633 22 38 -19 
Central & Southwest Corp . l 15 10 15 19 1800 27 90 ' 27 
Central V&oleta Sugar 7 21 10 24 17 1 4 -19 70 -29 
STOCKS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 81 9 
Dow Jones Industri al Avg . 93 213 161 258 281 202 32 09 
Century Ribbon Mill s 2 24 7 12 10 400 -58 -17 
Cerr o De Pas co ¢orp. 28 50 15 37 44 57 -12 29 
Certian-Teed Produc ts 2 25 9 18 15 550 -40 -1~ 
Cessna Aircraft 4 8 3 7 8 100 9 14 
Chain Belt 16 40 23 40 36 125 -10 - 10 
Champ ion Paper & Fib er 4 1 7 9 29 29 617 71 0 
hecker Cab Mfg . 1 33 5 9 7 600 -79 -22 
Gerry-Burrel l Corp . 8 27 10 12 10 25 -63 -17 
Chesapeake & Ohio RR 30 64 30 38 37 23 -42 -03 
Chicago Corp . 1 15 9 17 20 1900 33 18 
Chic •. & Eastern Ill . RR . 1 13 4 24 20 1900 54 -17 
Chic . Great Western RR . 2 13 7 33 23 1050 77 -30 
Chic . Ind, & Louis . RR "A" - - 6 18 14 - - - 22 
Chic. Mi l. St . P . & Pac RR . 
-
31 5 30 22 - 29 40 -27 
Chicago & North Western RR. 
-
41 10 26 20 
-
~51 1 0 -23 
Chicago Peumatic Tool 15 35 22 45 55 267 57 1 0 22 
Chic ., Rock Islknd & Pac RR. 
- -
26 60 69 
- -
1 3 15 
Chic ago Yellow Cab 9 24 10 13 12 33 ~50 0 -0 8 
Chi ca.sha Cotton Oil 11 23 13 19 11 0 -52 - 5 -42 
Childs Co l 1 19 2 8 4 300 ~64 1 0 - 50 
Chrysler Corp . 26 69 45 80 83 219 20 4 04 
Cincin . Ga s & El ec . Co . 
- -
27 35 39 
- -
4 11 
Ci ncin . Milling Mach . Co . 
-
36 20 36 34 - - 06 0 - 06 
C. I . T. Financial 21 58 47 51 71 238 22 
l l i 
39 
City Servi ce Co . 11 38 44 93 10 6 864 179 14 
City Aut o Stamping 4 20 13 20 22 450 10 I! 10 City Investin8 Co . 2 22 7 11 11 450 -iO 0 City Products 9 41 24 32 33 267 -19 03 
City Stores 3 38 14 21 18 500 -53 f~ -1 4 City & Suburban Homes 6 16 13 10 8 33 -50 -20 
Clark Equipment 12 27 16 43 34 350 50 2~8 26 
Claude Neon, I nc. 1 8 1 5 5 400 -38 4190 0 
Cleveland El . I llum . 23 49 40 46 55 139 12 ~8 19 
Cleveland Grap . Bronze 11 39 39 34 41 2~3 05 05 21 
Clmmax Mol ybdenum 33 36 12 33 37 12 03 ~ 1 12. 
Clinchf iled Coal Corp . 1 21 22 40 36 350 0 71 p4 - 10 
Clinto Foods, I nc . - - 25 32 22 - - [1.2 -31 
Cleutt, Pe abody & Co . ~6 61 21 26 2 9 12 -52 B8 12 
Coca- Col a Co. 56 196 132 124 112 100 - 43 ~f) -09 
Colgate-P al mo <hi ve P ee t 12 54 34 55 44 267 -18 £9 - 20 
Collins & Ailmnan 12 62 14 23 24 100 -51 171 04 
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STOW S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Dow Jones Indu strial Avg . 93 213 161 258 281 202 32 75 09 FiarChild Engine & Airpland 1 8 4 9 7 600 
- 12 75 -22 Fayardo Sugar 20 29 21 26 '22 10 
-24 05 - 16 Fans t e el Metallur gical 3 41 9 20 28 833 
-32 211 - 40 Feddes-Q.uigan 1 15 13 27 1 6 1500 07 23 -41 Federal Minin g & Smelting 20 51 32 60 75 275 47 134 25 Federal Mogul 4 24 15 30 24 500 0 60 -20 Federal Motor Tr u ck 3 20 3 9 6 100 -70 100 -33 Federal Dept. S torew 7 30 21 46 45 543 50 114 I -02 Ferro Corporat io n 8 34 13 20 31 288 - 09 138 55 
Fidelity Phenix Fire I ns. 28 49 49 69 78 178 60 60 13 
Fire stone Tire & Rubber 9 40 22 46 67 644 67 158 45 
F irst National Stores 15 35 30 42 43 186 23 43 02 
Fl intcote Co . 10 45 22 30 30 200 -33 36 I 0 Florsheim Shore Co. "A'' 9 30 12 17 14- 55 -52 12 -18 
Follansbee Steel 3 18 10 26 19 533 06 90 I' -26 Food Fair Store s 3 24 10 22 23 667 - 04 130 
I, 
0 5 
Food Machinery & Chemical 11 49 22 39 47 322 -04 113 -12 
Ford Motor Canada "A" 12 28 18 !6· 68 383 142 247 0 3 
Ford Mo tor Co. Ltd . 1 8 4 5 6 500 - 25 50 [ -20 Foster Wheeler 5 23 10 24 21 320 - 0 9 110 -17 F'ranc i sco Sugar 4 33 9 22 16 300 -52 78 - 28 
!<1reeport Sulphe r 9 20 14 29 43 378 115 204 
' 
49 
Froet ert Cor p . 4 23 12 16 16 300 -30 33 0 Fruehau~ Trai ler 7 39 14 29 27 288 -31 93 07 Gabriel Co . 2 15 4 9 6 200 - 60 50 -33 Gair (Robert) Co. 1 11 5 13 17 160 55 240 31 Gar Woo d 3 17 4 8 7 133 -59 75 -12 Gaylord Containe r Corp . 3 24 16 28 32 967 33 50 17 General Allo! Co. 1 7 1 4 2 1~0 - 71 t~~ :gg Gen er al Am. nvestor s ! 5 ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 6 ~ -f~ General Am . Tran s . 
General Baking 3 15 10 11 11 267 - 25 10 0 
General Bronze 3 22 8 19 17 467 -18 112 -10 
General Cable 2 15 6 11 10 400 - 33 67 - 0 9 General Cigar Co. 17 39 18 17 18 06 -54 0 0 6 General Dynamic s Co . 12 33 13 23 33 175 0 153 44 General Elec . Co . 49 32 56 64 191 31 50 14 22 Gen er a1 Foods 54 39 46 49 89 -11 26 07 26 154 14 27 ! -10 Genera:\. Mills 22 49 44 62 56 
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STOCKS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 8 9 
Dow Jone s Industrial Avg . 93 213 161 258 281 202 32 75 09 Haye s I ndus t ries 
Haz elt i ne i:::or p, 7 20 6 11 12 71 - 40 100 
09 
J.~· Helca Mining 4 12 
5 1 4 15 275 25 200 08 
Her cul e s Power Co . 4 18 9 14 15 275 - 17 67 08 
Heyden Chemical 28 69 40 79 74 1 64 J8 85 -06 
Holl and Fur nace Co . 6 46 15 22 18 200 - 61 20 -18 
Holl ander ( A:i:· & Son 9 17 20 26 22 144 29 10 -15 
Holli nger Cons . Gol d Mi nes 6 40 9 14 9 50 - 78 0 - 36 
Holl y Sugar Corp . 6 16 8 1 6 18 200 12 130 12 
Homestake Mini ng 1 4 3 4 17 22 19 35 - 74 12 -14 
Houdaille~He r shey 26 49 39 43 38 46 - 22 - 0 3 12 
Household Fi a anc e 9 25 19 l fi L4 ~6 ~4 56 Ol.'l 
Houston Ligh t i ng & Power 11 35 20 34 49 346 40 45 41 
Hous t on Oi l of Texas - 15 1 4 20 21 - 40 50 - 05 
Howe Sound 2 2 6 27 56 76 3700 193 181 36 
Hudso n Bay Mining & Smelt. 10 17 11 1 9 25 150 46 . 127 31 
Hudson Motor Car 18 46 34 58 67 272 46 97 16 
Humble Oi l & Refining 4 3 4 10 20 15 275 . - 56 5)0 - 20 
I-Iupp Corp . 12 38 35 66 76 533 l OJ 118 15 
Illinois Cent r al RR 1 11 2 4 4 300 - 64 100 0 
Ill i noi s Power 6 43 23 75 76 127 77 250 01 
I l linois Zinc 5 35 29 36 39 680 11 . 35 08 
Imp er i al Oi l Ldt . 5 18 6 . 75 24 380 33 300 - 04 
Ind . Power & Lighy 6 1 4 21 33 38 533 129 81 2 6 
I ndustrial Rayon 11 36 23 31 39 255 0 9 70 26 
Inge r soll - Ramd 11 54 34 72 64 482 1 3 89" -11 
Inl and Ste·el 28 76 56 84 94 215 3 3 S8 12 
Inspirati on Consol . Copper 18 44 30 62 48 1 67 09 60 - 23 
Ins . Co . of North Amer . 9 22 12 25 25 56 14 108 0 
Insuranshare s 24 46 42 65 84 250 82 100 29 
I nterchemi cal Corp. 5 12 9 12 14 180 17 56 17 
I ntercontinental Rubb er 11 29 20 29 21 91' - 2 8 05 - - 28 
Interl ake Iron 5 11 10 5 4 - 20 - 64 300 - 20 
f nt ernat :}. onal Bu s siness Mach . 6 18 9 20 17 183 - 0 6 89 -11 
n erna~lonal H~rvester 52 1 42 1 48 222 220 324 51 49 - 01 
I nternational Hydro El s e. "Att 14 32 23 37 38 151 03 52 - 05 
I nt' l Minerals & Chemical 1 15 5 14 22 2100 47 340 57 
I nt'l Mi ning 2 20 12 29 39 1850 96 1 42 37 
I nt' t Nicke l 2 10 4 4 3 50 - 70 - 25 - 25 
I nt 'l Packers Ltd. 25 42 25 40 47 8 6 12 89 18 
I n t ' 1 P ap e r Co • 21 35 9 15 11 - 47 -68 22 -27 
J 
4 20 17 55 52 1200 1 60 205 -06 
Hercul es Motor Corp 9 30 11 23 19 111 - 3 7 73 -17 
Dow Jones Industrial Avg . 93 213 161 258 281 202 32 75 09 
Tnt' 1 Pe troleum 28 22 6 16 33 256 50 450 10 6 
rnt' 1 Railways of Cent. Am . 2 26 5 10 8 300 -70 60 -20 
International Shoe 26 50 41 39 40 54 -20 -02 03 
International Silver 7 57 39 60 51 629 -11 31 -50 
Int'l Tel & Tel 2 28 7 16 18 800 - 36 157 12 
Interstat e Dept. Stores 9 26 19 25 32 256 23 69 28 
I ntertype Corp . 8 31 24 37 31 288 0 29 -16 
Irving Air Shute 8 12 4 9 6 -25 -15 50 -33 
I sland Creak Coal 13 24 24 39 34 161 42 42 08 
Jacobs (FL) "GO 2 21 3 7 5 150 - 72 67 -29 
Jefferson· Lake Suphur Co. 
- -
3 1 6 20 
- -
567 -25 
Jewel Tea Co. 19 60 48 69 69 262 1 5 44 0 
Johns-Manville Corp. 17 53 31 59 77 3.54 42 148 31 
Jones & Laughlin 9 21 10 30 24 60 14 140 -20 
Joy Mfg . 8 33 ' 32 34 36 350 0 9 12 07 
Kaiser-Frazer Corp . - - 4 8 5 - - 25 -38 Kalamazoo Stove & Furnace 7 37 9 19 18 157 -51 100 -0 5 
Kansas City Southern Ry . 3 37 35 75 84 2700 127 139 12 
Kyser (Jukius) & Co . 4 26 11 15 18 225 - 50 18 -13 
Keysey-Hayes Wheel "B" 6 26 1 4 30 33 450 28 58 10 
Kennecott Copper 26 59 40 79 83 218 S2 107 05 
Keystone Steel & Wire 4 18 12 25 22 450 - 22 08 -12 
Kimberly-Clark Corp . 13 35 17 50 50 285 43 194 0 
Kings ton Produc ts l 8 2 5 4 300 - 50 100 - 25 
Kirby Petro leum Co . 2 11 10 28 1300 64 180 0 0 
lt~~¥j~~s(ggl Co . - 45 26 43 44 - -02 70 02 
Kress ( AHJ & Co. 17 45 38 39 36 112 - 20 05 - 08 
Kroger Co . 19 61 52 56 54 183 -12 04 -0 4 
Laclede Gas Co. 12 31 2 4 39 38 217 23 58 -03 
Lake Shore s Mines Ltd . 8 9 6 8 9 12 0 50 12 
Lambert Co. 5 18 11 8 10 100 -33 -09 25 
Lane - Wells Co . 12 68 20 25 20 67 - 71 0 -20 
Le e Rubber & Tire 2 8 10 22 25 ii50 212 150 14 
Lehigh Coal & Navi gation 16 80 39 66 62 286 - 22 59 -O S 
Lehigh Portland Cemeny 4 16 7 12 9 125 - 44 29 -25 
Lehigh Valley RR 9 28 17 26 28 211 0 65 08 
Lehman Corp • 3 15 4 15 18 500 20 350 20 
Lehn & Fink Forud. 19 66 42 71 79 137 20 88 11 
Lerner Store s 12 33 9 ~1 2s5 25 - 55 67 07 6 45 23 317 Le Tourneau - 44 09 -07 23 56 12 21 26 13 - 56 117 24 
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STOCKS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Dow Jones Indu strial Avg . 93 213 161 258 281 202 32 75 0 9 Eibby- Owens-Ford Glass 10 35 23 35 37 270 06 61 06 Libby, McNei l & Libby 4 15 6 11 8 100 -47 33 27 Life Savers Corp 11 . 36 34 36 38 245 07 12 07 Liggett & Myers 31 102 88 77 66 30 -35 -18 -14 Lilly-Tulip Cup Corp . 12 37 19 52 61 412 65 I 221 17 Link Belt Co. 13 32 26 42 46 254 44 77 10 Lion Oi l Co . 3 10 20 46 40 1233 300 1Ch0 -13 Liquid Carbonic 14 41 13 22 20 429 - 51 59 -09 Lockheed Aircraft 7 17 8 21 24 243 41 200 1 Loew •s Inc . 12 41 16 19 14 17 -66 -12 - 26 Lone Star Cement 11 31 20 27 31 182 0 55 15 
one Star Gas Co. 6 20 21 27 27 350 35 29 0 Long - Bell Lumber 11 A" 3 33 15 47 38 1167 15 r 153 -19 Lori11ard (P) Co. 12 30 21 25 83 -27 05 -12 -12 Louisiana Land & Expl. 4 14 17 37 46 1050 228 112 24 ~ouisville Gas & Elec . of Ken. 12 31 27 30 37 308 19 37 23 Louisville & Nashtille RR 29 68 32 60 62 113 -09 95 03 Mack Trucks 14 38 10 21 14 0 -63 40 -33 Macy (RH} & Co . 17 65 28 38 30 135 - 54 07 -21 Madison Square Garden 4 21 9 10 9 120 - 57 11 -10 Magic Chef 8 34 5 17 9 12 -74 120 - 4.6 Magna Cooper Co . 20 30 10 36 .35 75 17 250 -04 Magnavox Co . 1 15 5 18 16 13Ch0 23 I 220 -11 Manati Sugar Co . 2 17 7 13 10 400 -41 ' 43 -23 Maracaibo Oil 1 6 7 10 12 1100 100 71 20 Marine Midl and 3 10 7 10 11 267 1m 1 57 10 Marion Power Shovel 2 18 5 16 14 600 -22 180 -12 Marshall Field & Co . 9 57 19 39 26 189 - 55 37 -33 Martmn ~mlenn L.} Co . 17 42 8 21 12 - 29 - 72 50 -43 Martin-Parry 4 31 11 14 12 200 -16 09 -14 Masonite Corp . 12 3 6 20 33 27 125 - 25 35 -18 Mathieson Chemical 10 19 18 37 47 370 1 55 161 26 May Dept. Stores 9 35 19 36 34 278 - 03 70 -07 Maytag Co . 1 15 7 16 16 1500 07 129 0 MeCall Corp . 9 70 20 27 18 100 -7 4 - 10 -33 McCrory Stores 5 21 15 21 16 220 - 24 07 -24 Me Graw Electric 14 46 30 51 68 385 47 126 33 McGraw-Hill Publishing 7 47 28 40 49 600 04 75 22 Mcintrye Porcupine Ltd . 28 64 49 65 78 179 22 69 20 McKesson & Robbins 
10 56 31 44 40 300 -29 29 -09 McLellan Stores 5 34 20 27 25 400 -26 25 -07 
Dow Jones Industrial Avg . 93 213 161 258 281 202 32 75 09 
¥:eade Corp . 5 24 11 27 26 420 0 8 136 - 04 
Meade Johnson & Co. 14 35 13 15 13 - 07 - 63 0 -13 
Melville Shoe 11 30 22 26 26 25 - 13 18 0 
Mengel Co . 5 :53 8 21 13 160 -61 62 -38 
Merritt-Chapman & Scott 3 15 13 25 25 733 67 93 0 
Mesabi Iron 1 8 4 9 18 1700 125 350 100 
Mest a Machine 25 61 30 54 46 84 -25 ii4 -15 
Mie.mil Copper 5 18 9 22 25 400 39 1~8 14 
Mid-Continent Fe troleum · 5 46 37 59 70 1300 52 92 19 
Midland Steel Products 8 29 18 47 43 438 481 139 - 08 
Minneapolis - Honeywell 10 34 23 46 52 429 13 126 13 
Minneapolis-Moline 2 19 10 24 19 850 0 90 - 21 
Minne apolis & St . Louis RR 
-
19 11 21 17 
-
-101 55 -19 
Minneapolis & St . Paul RR 
-
21 7 18 18 
-
-14 157 0 
Minneso ta Mining & Mfg . 6 12 17 42 42 600 250 1 47 0 
Mission Corp. 3 1 4 13 28 30 900 114 132 ~7 
Missouri - Kansas - Texas 1 15 3 13 8 700 - 47 1 67 -38 
Mo lybdenuim Corp . of Amr . 4 18 8 19 50 1150 178 525 162 
Monarch Machine Tool 9 22 11 22 18 100 -18 64 -18 
Mo nsanto Chemical Co . 22 60 44 84 98 347 63 123 17 
Montana-Dakota Utilities 5 18 11 15 29 480 Ill 1 64 94 Montgomery Ward 24 100 49 75 65 171 - 35 33 -13 
Motor Fro ducts 8 28 14 31 28 250 0 100 -16 
Motor Whee l 10 36 15 29 25 150 131 17 - 14 
Motorola, Inc . 
-
11 7 25 37 - 23 6 429 48 
Mueller Brass ll 33 12 22 22 100 -33 83 0 
Mullins Mfg. 2 10 9 20 26 1200 160 187 30 
Murphy ( GC} Co . 12 49 41 54 56 367 1 4 .37 04 
Murray Corp, of Amr . 5 20 10 23 20 300 0 100 -13 
Na sh- Kelvinator 5 24 11 23 21 320 -12 91 - 09 
National Acme 14 42 18 35 36 156 - 14 100 02 
National Airlines Q 31 8 7 14 - - 55 75 100 
National Automotive Fibers 3 21 10 20 19 533 -10 90 - 05 
Nat ional Aviation 6 27 10 22 21 250 - 22 110 -05 
Nat~pnal Bel las Hess 1 8 3 4 3 200 - 62 0 -25 
Nat ional Biscuit 13 36 32 35 34 162 -06 06 -0 2 
National Can 4 22 5 8 12 200 ~6 140 50 Nat ional Cash Register 14 45 23 49 58 313 29 152 18 Nat ional Container 1 12 5 13 12 1100 0 140 -08 
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I 
STOCKS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
, Dow Jones I ndustrial Avg . 93 213 161 258 281 202 32 75 09 
: National Cylinder Gas 7 22 9 15 17 157 - 18 1700 20 
National Dairy Products 13 45 . 30 48 56 331 25 88 1 7 
National Dept . Stores 3 38 14 24 16 433 - 58 14 -33 
National Disti llers P r od . 6 32 17 29 28 367 =~~ 65 -04 National Gypsum 4 32 12 2 22 450 83 -05 Nat ional Lead 4 14 9 26 32 700 12 256 25 
National Malleable & Steel 14 :56 14 35 36 87 87 03 
National Rubber Mach . 6 23 8 16 14 133 -3 75 -12 
Na tional Steel Corp . 15 34 24 55 50 233 47 108 - 09 
National Sugar Refining Co . 8 38 22 32 31 288 - 18 41 03 
National Supply 4 25 21 25 34 750 36 62 36 
National Tea l 21 13 25 27 2600 29' 107 08 
Natomas Co . of Cal . 7 14 10 10 7 0 - 50, -30 -30 
Nehi Corporation i 30 10 13 11 83 -~4 10 -15 
Neisner Bros . 4 26 18 18 15 275 - 43 - 17 -17 
New J ersey Zinc 51 80 51 77 66 38 -18 38 -14 
New Mexico & Armzona Land 2 11 6 11 19 850 -73 217 -73 
New York Air Brake 12 32 12 20 23 92 2 8 92 15 
New York Central RR 7 28 9 25 20 186 - 29 122 -22 
New York ,Chicago & St . Lc,uis RR 3 12 11 47 45 1400 275 309 -04 
New York City Omni '!Jus 13 37 10 17 17 31 - 5 4 70 0 
New York Ship Building 20 22 16 20 17 - 12 - 23 06 -23 
Newbury ( J Jj Co. 7 44 29 42 39 457 -lL 35 -07 
Newmont Mining 10 20 16 44 55 450 175 243 25 
Newport Industries 7 45 10 23 15 114 - 67 50 -35 
Newport News Shi~building & DD18 30 27 37 36 100 20 41 -03 
Niagara Mohawk P wer 2 19 12 22 27 1250 42 219 23 
Niles-Bement Pond 8 23 8 17 15 88 -321 88 -12 
Noma Elec t trc Corp , 2 24 6 11 12 500 -50 100 09 
Nopco Chemical Co . 15 36 11 20 22 47 - 39 l ChO 10 
Norfolk & Western RR 37 71 50 52 52 41 - 25 04 0 
North American Aviation 10 1 4 8 19 17 70 21 112 -10 
North Ameri can Co . 7 36 17 19 23 229 - 3 6 35 21 
Northern Natural Gas Co . 
-
29 32 35 40 - 38 25 14 
Northern Pacifi c RR 5 34 12 38 78 146 129 550 106 
Northern State s Power ( Mi nn) 1 14 10 10 12 1100 -1 4. 20 20 
Northwest Airline s 8 52 7 14 13 62 - 75 1 86 -07 
Novadel - Agene 11 40 14 18 18 54 -55 29 0 Ohio Brass 11 Bn 14 41 33 56 52 271 27 58 - 08 
Ohio Oil Co . 6 29 24 50 56 833 933 133 12 Oliver Corp . 5 18 10 15 16 270 -12 60 07 Omnibus Corp . 3 17 7 t~ ~~ r~~ -1& l~g 0§ Otis Elevator l3 38 28 
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STO CKS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 8 9 
Dow J one s I ndu s tri al Avg. 93 213 161 258 281 202 32 I 7 5 09 
Outbo e ard Marine & Mfg . 9 35 1 1 19 23 156 - 34 109 21 
owens -I ll i nois Gl ass 43 97 52 80 78 7 7 - 20 50 -02 
:P abco Products 7 29 16 19 1 5 112 - 48 63 - 21 
F ac ific Amer . Fi sheries 7 18 12 19 15 112 -17 25 - 21 
Pacific Gas & Elect r i .c 16 45 31 34 36 125 -20 1 6 0 5 
P a cifi c Li gh t ing Co rp . 26 64 50 53 52 100 - 1 9 04 - 0 2 
P' acific Mill s 8 46 28 50 3 5 33 8 -~7 25 -30 
Pacific Tin Con so l i dat e d 1 9 3 7 8 700 - 11 167 -14 
P aci f i c Western Oi l 2 11 10 17 2 3 1000 100 20 22 
Pac kard Motor Car 2 11 3 6 5 150 -36 57 -17 
Pan Ameri can Wor l d Airwa ys 6 20 8 1 2 11 833 -45 38 - 0 9 
P anhandle Easte r n P i pe Line ~ 28 26 45 79 - 1 82 203 75 
P anha.ndl e Oi l Corp . 1 1 4 6 10 8 700 - 43 33 -20 
Pan t epe e Oil Co . 4 13 5 7 6 50 54 20 -14 
Paramount Picture s Corp . 6 43 19 25 2 5 317 42 32 0 
P ark & Tilford 14 82 39 54 39 1 78 - 5ih 0 -11 
P ark Utah Cons . Co , 1 7 3 4 3 200 -57 0 - 2 5 
Park e, Dav i s & Co . 20 48 2 48 48 l .W 0 sn 0 
P arke r Rust Proof 14 3 4 2 4 34 37 164 09 1 54 09 P arme l le Transp ortat i on 1 21 6 8 s 700 - 62 . 33 0 
Pat ino Mines 17 22 10 21 11 - 35 -50 10 - 49 
Penick & Ford Ltd . 22 39 28 40 35 59 
-1o I 25 - 12 
Penney (JC} Co . 19 57 46 72 68 2 5 6 19 48 06 
P ennro Eld Corp . 3 9 7 14 13 333 44 86 - 07 
P enn . Coal & Co ke 2 1 6 7 15 1 4 600 -~2 10 0 -09 
Penn- -Dixie Cement 8 29 20 2 6 30 278 03 . 50 08 
Penn . RR 1 9 43 14 25 20 05 54 43 -20 
Penn Sal t 2 5 48 32 59 53 212 10 65 - 10 
Peop l es Dr ug St ores 17 68 3 5 3 4 32 89 -53 ' - 09 - 06 
Peopl es Gas Light & Co k e 36 115 98 105 145 308 26 I 48 38 
Pepperell Mfg . 1'7 64 50 74 73 329 14 46 -01 
F epsi - Cola 6 37 9 12 10 67 -73 I 11 - 1 7 
Fe t Mi llt Co . 19 43 22 48 42 12 -o2 I 91 -12 
Pe t rol eum Co r p . of Amer . 4 1 4 10 20 23 475 64 130 15 
F f e iff er Br ewi ng 2 6 9 22 17 750 1 83 I 89 - 18 
Ff izer ( Charles) & Co . 
-
27 1 4 30 36 ~ 33 1 57 20 
Ph elps ?Do dge 12 2 4 19 34 38 217 59 10 0 12 
Phil a . El e c tri c Co . 
-
31 21 28 31 - 0 48 12 
Phi1a . & Re ading Coal & Iron 
-
18 11 17 1 8 - 0 64 06 
Fhi l co Corp . 9 19 12 2 5 33 267 74 122 5 32 
Phmlip Morr is Ldt. 31 54 39 55 4 6 48 -15 I 18 20 
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STOCKS l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Dow Jones Industria Avg . 93 213 161 258 281 202 32 I 75 09 
Ron son Ar t Metal Wo r ks 1 16 10 16 13 1200 30 30 -19 
Ro t a r y El ec . Steel Co . 
-
37 17 42 46 
-
24 i71 10 
Royal Typewri t ers 10 39 1 4 24 21 110 -lO I 100 -12 
Roal i t e Oi l Co. Ltd . 
-
5 5 14 19 - 280 280 3 6 
Rubero id Co . 17 63 40 58 64 277 0 2 60 10 
Safeway Stores 10 35 21 38 33 2·30 - 0 6 I 57 -13 
St . Joseph Lead 19 51 29 51 45 132 -12 55 - 12 
St . Loui s -San Franci s co RR 
- -
8 30 27 
- -
238 - 10 
St . Regis Paper l 15 6 15 20 1900 33 233 54 
Savage Arms 10 1 6 10 21 1 6 60 0 60 - 25 
Schenl ey Industries 5 68 18 41 28 460 -59 56 -32 
Shulte (DA} I nc . 1 9 1 3 2 100 - 78 100 -33 
Scot t Paper 13 29 25 47 53 310 8 112 73 
Scovill Mfg . 20 46 21 36 32 60 - 30 52 -11 
Scull en Steel 5 16 8 32 29 480 81 2 62 - 09 
Seaboard Atr Lin e RR 
-
37 14 58 104 
-
182 645 80 
Seaboand Oil of Delware 10 38 38 84 88 780 131 131 05 
Sears, Roe buck & Co . 11 48 34 58 60 445 25 76 03 
Se i berl ing Rubber Co . 2 24 4 16 11 450 -5 4 175 -31 
Serve l 6 22 6 11 10 67 - 55 67 - 09 
Shrunrock Oil & Gas 2 31 25 36 40 1900 29 60 11 Shar on Steel 5 26 16 46 39 680 59 1 40 -15 Sharp & Dohme 14 27 23 42 44 214 63 95 0 5 Shat t uck {Fr ank G*) Co . 4 26 8 12 10 150 - 62 25 -17 Shattuck Denn Mining 2 9 2 7 7 250 -22 250 0 Shawinig an Water & Power 11 24 20 33 44 300 8~ 120 33 Shell Oi l Co . 10 41 30 58 78 680 90 1 60 35 Sheller Mfg . Corp . l 10 6 18 1 4 1300 40 125 22 Shearaton Corp . of Amer . 1 :}.6 5 11 14 1300 -12 180 27 Shewin- Wi lli ams 
Silver King Coalition 30 80 54 71 68 126 1 5 I 27 - 0 4 
Simmons Co . 2 13 2 5 3 50 - 77 50 -12 
Simmond s Saw & Steel Co . 12 56 22 35 31 1 59 -45 I 41 -11 
Sinc l air Oil 20 61 30 53 42 110 -31 40 -21 
i ng er Mfg . 3 20 19 39 48 1500 140 148 25 
Skell y Oi l 3 6 67 44 67 42 62 -37 -05 -37 
S1os s-She f fi e l d Steel & IronlO 12 49 84 88 780 111 I 79 05 
Smith (A) Cor p . 12 24 17 3"8 40 232 67 135 0 5 
Smith ( LC} & Corona Type 8 40 19 38 38 375 - 05 100 0 
Socony- Vacuum Oi l 10 49 10 25 21 110 -56 1110 -16 
Solar Aircraft 12 17 14 28 38 217 122 170 36 
S . A. Gold & Platinwn 2 29 11 1 6 19 850 -35 73 19 
South P enn Oi l Co . 11 8 4 6 6 500 - 25 50 0 
1 A. :Z,7 43 27 43 20 8 1 6 I 0 59 
. Dow Jones Industrial Avg . 93 213 .Lo.L :db!j :d!j.l :dV:d ., ~ ,- ·ro u~ 
South Porto Rico Sugar 18 58 29 64 65 260 12 124 02 
Sou t h Calif. Edison 15 39 . 31 35 37 146 -0 5 ~ 19 08 
south. National Gas Co . 9 33 29 44 60 597 82 107 37 
Southern Pacific 6 34 17 37 44 633 29' 159 19 
' Southern Railway 13 623 25 64 68 420 101 172 06 
Spaulding (AG} & Bra$ 1 30 10 16 13 1200 - 57j 30 -18 
Sp arks-Wi thington 1 12 3 7 5 400 -5s : 67 -29 
Spencer Kellogg 9 25 21 30 19 111 -2~ 10 -37 
Sperry Corp. 22 35 24 35 39 77 1] , 62 11 
Spiegal, I nc. 3 38 6 15 10 211 -71 67 -32 
Square D. Co. 9 24 13 24 33 264 38j 154 38 
Standard Branlts 12 55 18 27 2r1 125 - 51 50 0 Standard Oil of Cal . 9 29 28 50 62 589 11~ 121 24 Standard Oil Co . Ind . 21 49 36 66 84 300 72 133 28 Standard Oil of Ken . 11 30 29 41 41 272 3r~ 41 0 Standard Oil Co. (N . J . ) 16 39 29 52 81 405 108 179 56 Standard Oi l of Ohio 10 29 20 38 42 230 4q 110 11 Standard P acldn~ Standard Steel prings 2 46 6 11 11 450 -6~ 83 0 Starret (LS) & Co . 3 23 12 24 25 733 108 04 
Sterling Drug 24 49 27 45 41 71 -lq 52 - 09 
Stewart-Warner 21 liB 35 39 37 77 - 3 . 06 -0 5 
Stokley Van Camp 5 26 10 19 20 300 - 2 100 05 
Stone & Webster 3 39 10 20 15 400 fi) 50 -25 
Studebaker Corp . 4 24 13 24 31 675 2 138 29 
Sun Chemi cal 4 38 17 35 38 850 122 09 
Sun Oil Co . 4 24 7 12 9 125 29 -25 
Sunbeam Corp . 36 63 54 71 89 174 65 25 
Sunray Oil 5 13 11 27 30 500 173 11 
Sunshine Biscuits 1 14 9 21 21 2000 133 0 
Sunshine Mining 8 51 41 60 69 762 68 15 
Super ior Oi l of Calif 4 22 9 14 10 150 11 -29 
Superior Steel 30 160 128 410 525 1635 311 28 
Sutherland Paper 5 25 10 24 23 360 130 - 04 
Swift & Co . 10 26 16 25 26 16J 63 -04 
Sylvania Electric Prod . 21 40 28 39 33 57 18 -15 
Symington-Gould 13 37 18 29 36 177 100 24 
Techno calor 4 15 4 10 7 75 75 -30 
Teautograph Corp . 5 27 13 22 22 175 69 0 
Tennessee Corp . 4 13 3 6 5 25 67 
-l-7 
Texas Co . 8 25 1 4 32 40 400 185 25 
Texas Gulf ~reducing 15 32 25 47 59 294 136 26 
Texas Gulf Sulpher 2 16 11 28 30 1400 !~2 g~ Texas Pacific Coal & Oi l 39 59 56 105 116 197 3 16 16 41 42 1300 Tecas Pacific Land Trust fZ. f)&::, ?.A 86 161 2583 325 
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STOCKS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Dow Jones Industrial Avg . 93 213 161 258 281 202 32 75 09 
Warren Foundry & Fipe 24 ll 19 42 28 17 -42 47 -38 
Warren P'etroleum - 15 14 35 31 - 107 122 -11 
Waukesha Motor 12 32 12 19 18 50 -44 50 -05 
Wayne Pump 13 45 12 18 15 15 67 25 -17 
·Nebb & Knapp 1 3 1 1 2 100 -33 100 100 
Wesson Oil & Snowdrift 8 20 20 36 31 288 55 55 -14 
West Indies Sugar 
-
45 17 35 33 
-
- 27 94 - 06 
est Penn Electric 2 27 18 30 35 165 29 95 17 
West Virginia Coal & Coke 3 17 14 20 13 333 - 23 07 -35 
West Viginia :P ulp & P.aper 13 51 36 84 84 547 65 133 0 
Western Airlines 2 27 6 14 12 500 - 66 lCDO -14 
Western Auto Suppli es 13 90 33 46 50 282 -33 131 09 
Western Maryland RR 2 12 9 29 22 1000 8 122 -24 
Western Pacific RR - 56 20 56 56 - 0 182 0 
Western Union nAn 26 40 13 47 44 70 10 239 -0 6 
Westinhouse Air Br ake 11 32 17 27 26 136 -19 53 -04 
Westinghous Elec . Corp . 17 26 21 38 42 147 62 100 16 
estern Elec. I n sts . 24 64 22 34 41 71 - 36 87 20 
Wheeling steel 8 25 12 42 38 375 52 217 -09 
White Mo tor Co. 12 42 13 30 27 125 -36 197 -10 
hite Sewing Machine 4 11 10 22 11 175 0 10 -50 
ilcox Oil 2 12 8 17 27 1250 125 238 59 
Willy-Overland Mo tous 2 2 4 4 12 10 400 - 58 150 -17 
ilson & Co. 4 20 9 14 12 200 - 40 33 -14 
Woodley Petrole um 3 10 10 18 69 2200 590 590 283 
oodward Iron 9 26 22 50 56 522 11 1 53 12 
Woolworths (~V) Co . 22 62 46 46 44 100 -29 -04 - 04 
Worthington Corp. 5 22 12 28 32 540 45 1 67 14 
Wright -Hardgre aves Ltd . 1 5 2 2 2 100 - 60 0 0 
Wrighley (Wm. } Jr . Co . 44 80 68 78 75 71 -06 10 -04 
Wyandotte Worsted Co . - 23 8 20 12 - -48 50 -40 
Yale & Towne 18 61 20 40 37 106 - 40 85 -07 
York Corporation - 25 8 13 19 - -aa 138 46 
Young (LA) Spring & Wire 6 55 18 39 32 433 - 42 78 -18 
Youngstown Shee t & Tube 14 42 27 60 47 234 121 74 -22 
Youngstown Steel Door 7 29 11 20 16 129 -4~ 45 -20 
Zenith Radio 11 37 21 72 79 618 11 
275 07 
Zonite Products 2 14 4 6 5 150 -64! 
25 -17 
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Period 3. - (Co l umn 8} - June , 1949 - August, 1952. 
"Average" increased 75% 
Stocks that increased t he same or more than t he Average~a~~49% 
Stocks that did no ·t increase as much as the Average ......... 511& 
Stocks not repo r ting ••••••••a~•••••·~•••••••••••••••••••a•00}6 
100% 
Stocks that declined in value for the period••••••••••~··· 04% 
Period 4. - (Column 9) - February, 1951 - ugust, 1952 . 
"-Average" increased 9% 
Stocks that increas ed the same or more th~n the A.verage ••• • 31% 
Stocks that did not increase as much as the Average .... ..... 69% 
Stocks not reportin5 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••oo% 
100~ 
Sto cks that declined in value for the period$•••••••••••• • 50% 
An interpretation of t he above fact s is as follows: 
1. The "Average" in dipicting the market for the periods 
April, 1942 - August, 1952, and February, 1951 - Augus t, 1952, 
was barely accurate. Since in the former case 54% of the 
stock s s tudied agreed wi t h the 11Average" and 49% in t he latt er 
period $ and only an insignificant percentage dec . ined . 
2 . It should be noted that in both the s e periods the .. vera en 
went f rom a low to a high point , and in t he per iods May, 1946, 
and F bru ary, 1951- August, 1952, the 'Average" went from a 
previous peak to a new high., 
3. In t he May, 1946 - August, 1952, span, 74% of the stocks or 
almost three foarths of t hose studied fai led t o rise as much as 
the " verage" and 54% not only did not rise as high as the "Avera e 1 
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but declined in value. - hile in t he 19 months from Februar,r, 
1951 - August, 1952, only 31% a reed wi th the " vera e" and 
50% declined. in value. Bo th times the "Average" went from an 
old high t o new h i ghts wh le the stocks on the market tself 
represent ed b 950 shares, not only did no t rise s.s much for 
the ·period but actually dec lined . 
4 . Another significant point is that although t he "Aver re " 
reached its h i h in August, 1952, 51% of the s.tocks studied 
.acheived theirs in May, 1946, and 17% did so in February , 1951 
T_u s l e avi ; l ess t han 29% that achieved their high point in 
t he same period as t he Average assuming only a mominal number 
achieved their peaks in April, 1942 and Jun~ , 1949. The table 
that follows summari zes t h e results. 
Table XIV. 
ction of 950 Common Stocks Vs. Dow Jones I ndustrial Average 
April, 1942 to November, 1952 
Period 
April '42- u • '52 
May ' 46- u . ' 52 
Jur1e ' 49 - ·ug a 1E2 
3'eb. '51 - Aug . r 52 
fa confo rming 
with Aver·age 
54% 
24% 
49% 
311'; 
% not confoi'ming 
wi th A. vera ·e 
40% ,-
74% 
51% 
69% 
r;not 
report in _ 
~~ 
o% 
0°S 
%decline 
in value 
% 
54% 4% 
50% 
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The ques t ion might be r a ised that the 950 issued studied 
I . 
included u t i l ities and railr a ads a s well as industri al s, and s i nce 
the "Average' i s purely an industri al one, t he statistics don't 
apply. To dispell this querie the m:tm.erical data was analyzed as 
previously , but excluding all utilities and r ai ls, except American 
1:P e lephone and Telegraph which is a memb6r of t he "Average 11 , t he 
figures reveal es senti ally t he same results e.s achieved i ncluding 
t hose ssues , as fol l ows : 
p·eriod 1. • (Col umn 6 . - excluding util i t ies and rai l s 
excep t Amer i can Te. & Tel. - 875 industrial 
shares} - April, 1942 - ugust , 1.952 · -
Average increased 202% 
Stocks that i creased t he s ame or more than t he Average •••• 53% 
St ocks that di d no t increase as much as the Average •• •• • ••• 42% 
Stocks not reportin • • • •••••• • ••• ••••• • •• •••• · •••••••• • •• 5% IOo% 
Stocks that declined in value for the period Ol% 
Period 2. - {Col umn 7. excluding utili t ies and rai l s 
excep t American Tel . & Tel. - 875 industr ial 
shares} l ay , 1 946 - ugust, 1952 - Average 
increa s ed 3 2% 
St ocks that increased t he s ame or more than the Average • ••• 23% 
Stocks that did no t i ncre a se a s much as the Average •••• ~ •••76% 
Sto cks not r eport ing••• • ••• • • • •• • • • ••• • •• •• •••• ••• • • •• •• • 01% 1oo1s 
Stocks t h at ddc lined in value for t he period 
Per i od 3 . - (Col~n 8 . exc l udin utilities and rails 
except American Tel . & Tel. - 875 i ndustrial 
sh are s } Juno , 1949 - August, 1952 - Aver a e 
i ncr eas ed 75% 
Stock s t h a t i ncreased t he same or more t h an t he Average • •• 47% 
Stocks that di d not i ncrease as much as t he Average •• • • • • • 53% 
Stocks no t reporting • •••• • • •• •••••• ••••• • •• ••• ••• • •• •••• ··~ 
10 0 7o 
Stock s t h a t declined in value f or t h e period •• •• •••• •• • • • 04% 
-106-
eriod 4. - (Column 9 excluding utilities and ra l s . 
except American Tel . & Tel. - 8?5 · ~ndustrial 
shares February , 1951 - Au )"ust, 1952 -
Average increased 9% 
Stocks that· increas~d the same or more than the veragev ••• 30% 
c5/ Stocks t hat did not increase as much as the Average ••••••• 70~ 
Stocks notre orting-~·•••• ••••••••·~·••••••••••~••• .e•• ••• OO % 
100% 
Stocks t hat declined in value for the period ••• lit ••• •••• 
' Table XV., 
Ac tion 875 Industrial Common Stocks Vs. Dow .Jones Industrial Avera e 
April, 1942 to November· 1952 
... eriod %conforming %not conforming %not %decline 
with Average with Average reporting in value 
pril 1949- ug f 52 53% 4B% 5% 1% 
May 1946-Au . '52 23% 76% 1% 56% 
June 1949-Aug. 1 52 471{, 53% o% 4% 
Feb. 1951- ug .. '52 30% 70% & 52% O o 
The only other information that is required for purposes) of t h is 
paper is to determine how the components of the "Avera e" fared 
within the scope of this ·study . It was pointed out earlier in 
"Chapter 4" that as a result of using a low constant diviso r, and 
the domination of leaders, the "Average" fails not only in reflec -
ting the market accurately, , but also in presenting the action of 
its components . Studyin the data of the thirty member stocks 
for the four periods examined, reveals the following facts: 
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Table XVI. 
ction of Thirty Component Stocks of Dow-Jpnes I ndustr ial ~verage 
Per iod 1. - pri l , 1942 - August, 1952 
Stocks that rose above the Aver age •••••••••• l2 
Stocks t ha t fell below the Avera e ~·~••••••• l8 
Stocks ·sho~ing declines ........ .. .. ... ... .... 0 
Period 2 . - May, 1946 - Au ust , 1952 
Stocks that rose above the ·verage ............ l 5 
Stocks that fell below t he Average ••••••e•••l5 
Stocks showing declines .. . ... .. .. ... . ••• • •• 6 
Period 3. - June, 1949 - August, 1952 
Stocks that rose above the Average •• •••••••• l7 
Stocks that fell below the era e -~····••••13 
Stocks showing decline s ...................... 3 
Perio d 4 . - February, 1951 - ugust, 1952 
Stocks that rose above the Average •••••••••• 1~ 
Stocks t hat fel l be l o r the A.verage . .... ....... . 17 
Stocks showin dec1ines ••••••• ••••••••••••• •• 12 
I n three out of four periods 50% or over of the compo ~ 
nents failed to increase as such as the n ver a e 11 • I n the 
' period Febru ry, 1951 - August , 952, 40% of ~h s t ocks sto ed 
de clines, l et alone in reasing to the extent of the ' verage ' , 
etc. , t hu s t appears that the " verage" is none t o accurate 
in revealing the movements of its components . I t is no ~nder 
then, as we have previously learned , that it fails in dipictin 
the stock market itself ~ 
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Chapter 6 
Stm~ary and Conclusions 
In the preceding chapters we have examined the Dow-Jones 
I ndustrial verage rather comp l etely . As a matter of introduction 
we learned that the "Aver{l.ge" i s the most widely used and t herefore 
the most important of the sto ck market indicator s ~ It was fo r 
tha.t reason to ether wi th the fact that its accuracy had been 
questioned, that this t hesi s was written . Thus our purpose here 
/ 
has not been purel y academic, but t o provide the inve stor ·. th 
some concrete measure of accuracy so that he may employ t he 
" verage" intelli gently. 
Logically we first approached the problem by historical ly 
tracing the "Average" from its incep tion to the present period 
under surveilance . Here we combined a short history of the 
stock market with a chronological account of t he changes which 
occured in the composi ti·on and method of computing the 11Average". 
The emphasis of this survey was placed on t hose years when tho 
stock marke t experienced pronounced flucuations . Next the present 
st atus of the " vera. ,.e" !'las examined rather <XS.:eaful l y . The Dow 
Theory and· formula. pl ans employing the " vera e" were di scussed 
emphazing the i mpo rtance of the '·'Average" in their marke t deter mi -
nations. The following chapte:r W§S cd'l{cerned with the t hree 
ma j or criticisms of the " verage" . I t was indicated that as a 
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result of an inadequate me t hod of computation , a narrow scope, and 
domination by l eader s, t ha t t he 1 ' verag " fails to give 
picture of stock market activity . 
true 
Up to this point we had dealt almost exclusively with 
material gathered from secondary sources, and althou h we had 
assembled cons iderable knov1ledge concerning the 11 veragen , we 
still hadn't soy facts to indicate the actual degree of accura~y 
which t possessed. To eliminate this deficiency an indep endent 
statistical study was formulated and executed, invol ving a compr -
son of 950 common stocks and the Dow-Jone s Indust~ial vera ·e for 
the over - all period , Arp il, 1942, to November, 1952, plus several 
int ermediar y per iods in be t we en . The results oft J:lfl analysis were 
rather conclusive . For the over-al l period of ten years and six 
months the "Average" was correct in 54% of the ca ses, and this 
tu~ned out to be its best performance. · I n the three subp eriods 
examined, i t was only r i ght in 24%, 49%, and 31% of the cases 
r espectfull y, and in two of these 50% and over of the stocks 
declined in val ue . 
One might now say and rightl y so, we have proof t hat the 
' verage 11 can't be trusted, therefore we vlill employ it no longer. 
However, I don't beli eve the problem is t hat si mp l e . The "Indus-
trial Average" serves a very useful purpose as anyone who in the 
investment business will agree . Thus before it can be discarded 
.,., 
an appropriate substitute must be presented in its stead . Well , 
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if that is t he case, how bout using another indicator , for instance 
Standard and P·cors Industria . ·Verage. Scien t i fically speakihg 
t her e i s no doubt that this i ndex eliminates some of the fallacies 
that combine to make the "Industrial vera en naccura.te, but the 
question is how meny? We learned in the section on comparison of 
market indicators that t here seemed to be no major basi c differences 
in t he forecastin of the t~o marke t i ndicators . Thi s s t udy wa s 
by far i n no way conclusive and the problem would have to be s tudied 
much more extensively. 
There is also the fact that Standard and Poors Index has 
been pr nted for some twenty-five years and as yet has in no . wsw 
affected the popularity of the "Industrial Avera e ." When people 
have been in the habit of doing something for as lon0 a period 
as they have been employing the Dow-Jones vera es, it is extremely 
difficult t o change even in: the f 'e:e:e o.t· suc.}l eVJil.dence as pre s ented 
here . 
Therefore T believe the only rea.sonable so l u.tion o f the 
problem is two- ol d as f oll ows : 
ih. Dis semi.na.t e to the inve st ing publ ic the fact s concerned 
with the inaccuracies of·t h e " verage" in order t hat t hose \'lho 
still continue to use it , will do so intelli ent ly . Thus when 
re f errin to it , i t wi 11 no ·t be quoted blindly, but employed onl 
as one-. of t he many m a.sure s to which an individual will refer t o , 
in makin ·his deci sion concernin t h e nat ure of s t occ market activ -
ity . 
2. Bring pressure on t hose.who · co.ntrol nd publish the 
"Average'' to institute reforms in t he me thod of comput·ing and the 
compo sition of' the indicator, .so as to i 1~ove ts rel iab ility. 
Such change~ onl made a£ter considerable study wou d include such 
t hings as we i ghting, incr e asing the number of com1)0nents; elimlna-
t ing "bluechip" shares and reolacln them with more represent t ive 
stocks , etc. Thus in t his way the pnnposes of this s t udy would be 
ach_eved ~ 
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